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C. The Importance of Board Composition in Corporate
Theory
1. Shareholder Primacy Theory
2. Stakeholder Theory
3. Nexus of Contracts Theory
D. A Response to Critics
1. The Argument that Most Boards Are Mostly
Unimportant
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D. Possible Objections and Exceptions
E. Why Disclosure Must Be Required
VI. CONCLUSION
I. INTRODUCTION
It was an extraordinary time, the years 2007 through 2009. The world’s
financial system shuddered. Governments intervened.1 The U.S. Treasury
invested billions of dollars in American financial institutions.2
Many of these institutions were public companies, as their stocks were
traded on national exchanges.3 Securities laws and regulations required
those companies, and large investors in them, to file disclosure documents
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). These filings aimed
to provide the public with information, including information about each
company’s board of directors.
Disclosure about boards is critical because boards occupy a special
place in corporate governance. Boards sit atop the corporate hierarchy.
Boards control corporations. In an important sense, a corporation’s board is
the corporation.

1. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 5211 (Supp. V 2011) (establishing the Troubled Assets Relief Program).
2. See Meena Thiruvengadam, U.S. Bailouts So Far Total $2.98 Trillion, Official Says, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 31, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123851108664173877.html.
3. Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of 2008, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 253,
253 n.2 (2009) (noting the financial institutions assisted by the federal government during the crisis,
including: Wells Fargo, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs).
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Not surprisingly, therefore, as the federal government sought to
influence the actions of financial companies at the epicenter of the credit
crisis, the government turned its attention to those companies’ boards.
Extending its powerful reach, the government in some cases effectively
dictated which directors stayed, which left, and which joined anew.4 But
neither the government nor the affected corporations timely disclosed these
moves through public filings with the SEC.5 They didn’t have to.6
The experience at two huge public companies, American International
Group, Inc. (AIG) and Bank of America Corporation (BofA), provides a
close-up look at this phenomenon. The government’s actions to push some
directors out at AIG and BofA, and to usher other directors in, were reported
slowly and incompletely in the first case7—and not at all (until the press
discovered the facts) in the second.8 Slow SEC filings at AIG and no SEC
filings at BofA resulted, in part, from the federal government’s complete
immunity from reporting obligations under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (the Exchange Act). But even had this blanket immunity been absent,
other possibly relevant rules—designed to force private market actors to
disclose their efforts to change public company boards—would not have
required disclosure of the government’s moves.
Using AIG and BofA as case studies, this Article makes a simple claim:
When the government takes steps to change the composition of a board at a
company that is publicly traded, a new SEC filing should report those steps,
just as SEC filings must report the efforts of private market actors trying to
change the directors.9 The analysis proceeds so: Part II describes the board
change at AIG and BofA and the filings with the SEC that provided slow (in
one case) or no (in the other) disclosure of the government’s efforts to
change the directors at those companies. Part III identifies one large hole in
the law governing securities filings, and several more technical ones, that
permitted government intervention in board composition to escape the
prompt disclosure required when other market participants intervene. Part
IV argues that prompt revelation of who is influencing board change, and
why they are doing so, is important for reasons both practical and
theoretical—and that the securities laws and regulations already recognize

4. For a discussion of how the government did, in two cases, effectuate a change in the board,
see infra Parts II.A.3, II.B.4.
5. See, e.g., infra Parts II.A.4, II.B.5.
6. See, e.g., infra Part III.
7. See infra Part II.A.4.
8. See infra Part II.B.5.
9. See infra Parts IV–V.
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this truth by requiring timely disclosure of such efforts by private market
actors. Part V proposes a new securities rule that would require quick
disclosure of government steps to change board composition at public
companies and identifies a limited exception that should be included in the
rule. Because the government officials and companies involved may have
their own incentives to avoid disclosure, only a new rule will effectively
close the odd information loophole that permits the government to do what
private market actors cannot: to take secret actions to change directors at
publicly traded firms.
II. THE GOVERNMENT TAKES CONTROL OF TWO BOARDS
In 2008 and 2009, the federal government put billions of bailout dollars
into AIG and BofA.10 The government then engineered changes in the board
of directors at each of those companies. At AIG, securities filings
effectively disclosed that the government had the power to dictate the
composition of the AIG board, but the filings did not disclose the
government’s use of that power in the departure of particular directors or
disclose, in a timely way, the selection of new ones.11 At BofA, securities
filings failed to disclose the government’s role in board change altogether.12
A. American International Group
This section begins the AIG case study with the government
investment.13 It then turns to the board change 14 and the government’s role
in that change.15 The section ends by describing the securities filings that
accompanied the board change, noting that some filings did not reveal the
government’s action at all, while others did, but only long after the fact.16
1. The Government’s Shareholder Interest
On the brink of collapse, AIG entered into a Credit Agreement with the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York on September 22, 2008.17 By that

10. See infra Parts II.A.1, II.B.1.
11. See infra Part II.A.4.
12. See infra Part II.B.5.
13. See infra Part II.A.1.
14. See infra Part II.A.2.
15. See infra Part II.A.3.
16. See infra Part II.A.4.
17. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 26, 2008), at Ex. 99.1 (Credit
Agreement between American International Group, Inc. and Federal Reserve Bank of New York)
(Sept. 22, 2008) [hereinafter AIG Change of Control Credit Agreement]. Throughout, I date all SEC
documents by their filing.
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agreement, the government provided an $85 billion revolving credit facility
to AIG in exchange for, among other things, AIG’s promise to issue to the
government preferred stock that would vote with the common stock on all
matters submitted to the shareholders.18 The deal required the preferred
stock to hold 79.9% of the total voting power at AIG19 and mandated that
AIG issue the preferred stock to a trust that the government would create to
hold that stock (the Trust).20 The Credit Agreement further and expressly
required that AIG “use all reasonable efforts to cause the composition of
[AIG’s] board of directors . . . to be, on or prior to the date that is ten days
after the formation of the Trust, satisfactory to the Trust in its sole
discretion.”21
The government formed the Trust in mid-January 2009.22 The New

18. Id. at 1, 43 (§ 5.11), Ex. D.
19. Id. at Ex. D; Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 44 (Nov. 6, 2009). AIG
received other assistance from the government during the credit crisis, and the government received
other AIG securities as part of providing additional assistance. For example, the U.S. Treasury
purchased Series D Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock from AIG on November 25,
2008 for $40 billion. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 26, 2008). For a
summary of the assistance, and restructuring of the government aid, see William K. Sjostrom, Jr.,
The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943, 963–75 (2009). Among other things, restructuring
reduced the percentage of the government’s total voting power to 77.9%. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc.,
Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 44 (Nov. 6, 2008).
The government and AIG recast their relationship in January 2011. AIG completely paid all
amounts owing on the September 22, 2008 Credit Agreement. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report
(Form 8-K) (Jan. 14, 2011). AIG preferred stock held by the Trust described in the text converted to
AIG common stock, and AIG preferred stock owned directly by the Treasury converted partly to
AIG common stock, partly to a new class of preferred, and partly to interests in other special
investment vehicles. Id. The Trust transferred all of its AIG common stock to the Treasury. Id.
After this recapitalization, the Treasury held 92% of all AIG common. Id. In May 2011, AIG sold
100 million shares of AIG common stock to the public, and the government sold 200 million of its
common shares to the public. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 27, 2011). In
2012, the government sold more than 206 million shares in March, more than 188 million in May,
more than 188 million in August, almost 637 million in September, and more than 234 million in
December. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 13, 2012); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc.,
Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 10, 2012); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Aug.
8, 2012); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 14, 2012); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc.,
Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 14, 2012). The last of these sales brought the government’s
common stock holding in AIG to an end. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Prospectus Supplement (Rule
424(b)(3)), at S-3 (dated Dec. 10, 2012, filed Dec. 12, 2012).
20. AIG Change of Control Credit Agreement, supra note 17, at 43. Section 1.01 of the
agreement defines the “Trust.” Id. at 19.
21. Id. at 43 (§ 5.11).
22. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 23, 2009), Ex. 10.1 (Jan. 16, 2009), at
2–3 [hereinafter AIG Credit Facility Trust Agreement]. Subsection 1.01 formed the Trust. Id. at 2.
Subsection 2.01(a) stated that the trustees would establish a securities account. Id. at 3. Subsection
2.02(a) stated that the preferred stock would be deposited in the securities account. Id. at 4.
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York Federal Reserve Bank appointed the trustees, “in consultation with the
Treasury Department,”23 and AIG issued Series C Convertible Participating
Preferred stock to the Trust on March 4, 2009.24 The trustees then
“possess[ed] all right, title, and interest” in the shares25 and had “the
exclusive right to exercise any and all voting . . . rights . . . attached to” those
shares.26 The trustees held the stock “for the sole benefit of the Treasury.”27
As AIG repeatedly acknowledged, the preferred stock gave the government
the power to control director elections.28
2. The Board Change
To see the government’s effect on the AIG board, we must trace the
board’s composition back to the spring of 2008 and keep in mind that the
government’s initial investment in the company—which included the
condition that the government acquire voting control of AIG—occurred in
September 2008.29 We must also recall that (i) directors are elected by
shareholders at annual meetings;30 (ii) the sitting board, with the help of its
nominating committee, nominates a slate of candidates—usually the
incumbent directors—to run for director positions at the annual shareholder

23. Id. at 2 (§ 1.02).
24. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar, 5, 2009); see also Am. Int’l Grp.,
Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K/A) (Mar. 13, 2009), at Ex. 10.1 (Series C Convertible, Participating
Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement) (Mar. 1, 2009).
25. AIG Credit Facility Trust Agreement, supra note 22, at 3 (§ 2.01(a)).
26. Id. at 6 (§ 2.04(a)).
27. Id. at 3 (§ 2.01(a)).
28. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 27 (Mar. 2, 2009) [hereinafter AIG
2008 Annual Report] (“As a result of its ownership of the Series C Preferred Stock, the
[government-formed] Trust will be able . . . to elect all of AIG’s directors . . . .”); Am. Int’l Grp.,
Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 12 (June 5, 2009) [hereinafter AIG 2009 Proxy Statement].
The government selected not only AIG’s board, but also its CEO. Edward Liddy assumed the top
executive spot “in connection with the transactions entered into between AIG and the NYFed and
the Department of the Treasury.” AIG 2009 Proxy Statement, supra, at 18; see also infra note 61.
When Liddy later left the company—announcing his decision even before the 2009 shareholder
meeting, id. at 15—AIG stated that the search for his replacement would “include participation by
both the reconstituted Board of Directors,” which included a majority picked by the government, and
“the Trustees of the AIG Credit Facility Trust.” Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K)
(May 21, 2009). As AIG had stated in its Annual Report for 2008, the government had the ability
“to control . . . the selection and tenure of AIG’s Chief Executive Officer.” AIG 2008 Annual
Report, supra, at 27.
29. “On March 1, 2009, AIG entered into the Series C Preferred Stock Purchcase agreement
with the Trust . . . . The aggregate purchase price . . . was $500,000, with an understanding that
additional and independently sufficient consideration was also furnished in September 2008 by the
NY Fed in the form of its $85 billion lending commitment under the Fed Credit Agreement.” AIG
2008 Annual Report, supra note 28, at 42.
30. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2011).
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meetings;31 and (iii) when directors resign or die during their term, the sitting
board elects replacements who serve until the next annual meeting.32
Accordingly, board change occurs only in two circumstances: when
incumbents running for reelection lose in contested director elections,33 or
when incumbent board members resign, die, or decline to run for reelection.
In the latter case, their successors are either elected to the board—between
shareholder meetings—by the sitting board, or nominated (usually by the
sitting board) to run for election at the next annual meeting.34
In this case, the AIG board nominated thirteen candidates for
directorships in 2008.35 The shareholders elected all of them at the 2008
AIG annual meeting in May of that year.36 All this occurred before the
government bailout.37
But after the September 22, 2008 bailout in which AIG agreed to give
the federal government voting control,38 the board dramatically changed.
Between the bailout and the 2009 election, eight directors including the CEO
either resigned or decided against running for another term.39 The sitting
31. See, e.g., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.04(b)(i)
(2013), available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm/ [hereinafter NYSE LISTED COMPANY
MANUAL].
32. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 223(a)(1) (2011). As an alternative to replacing a director who
dies or resigns, the company can reduce the size of the board.
33. This rarely happens. A famous study found only forty-five instances in the period from
1996 through 2005 in which “rivals seeking to oust incumbent [directors] succeeded in gaining
control” of a company. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV.
675, 687 (2007) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Shareholder Franchise]. In neither the AIG nor the BofA
case was a director election contested and, accordingly, no director turnover at either company
occurred as a result of a board member’s defeat in a shareholder vote.
34. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b), 223(a)(1).
35. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 7–9 (Apr. 4, 2008).
36. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 124 (Aug. 6, 2008).
37. See AIG 2008 Annual Report, supra note 28, at 42.
38. See supra notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
39. Between the 2008 election and the 2009 election, eleven directors left the board, with the
dates of their departures showing that eight left after the September 22, 2008 deal. Am. Int’l Grp.,
Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 16, 2008) (concerning the departure of CEO Sullivan); Am.
Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 1, 2008) (also concerning the departure of CEO
Sullivan); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 17, 2008) (announcing Holbrooke
resignation); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 22, 2008) (announcing Futter
resignation); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 24, 2008) (announcing
Willumstad resignation); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 3, 2008)
(announcing Langhammer resignation); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 25,
2009) (stating Tse not running for reelection); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar.
31, 2009) (stating Rometty and Sutton not running for reelection); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current
Report (Form 8-K) (May 21, 2009) (stating Bollenbach, Feldstein, and Orr not running for
reelection); see also AIG 2009 Proxy Statement, supra note 28, at 13.
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board elected40 two new directors, one of whom was the new CEO, Edward
Liddy.41 The board then nominated eleven candidates for election at the
2009 shareholder meeting.42 The shareholders—with the government
holding almost eighty percent of the votes—elected all of them43 to a board
now reduced from thirteen to eleven members.44
As the next section shows, the government had seized control.
3. The Government’s Role in the Change
In evaluating the government’s influence on the radical restructuring of
the AIG board, consider first the departures from the board. Then consider
the additions.
It is fair to infer that the government caused or at the least agreed to the
eight departures from the AIG board that occurred after AIG signed the
Credit Agreement on September 22, 2008 and before the 2009 director
elections. Delaware law provided the government—once it acquired the
majority voting power as a result of that agreement—the power to remove
any AIG director, with or without cause.45 Thus, if a director had not
resigned when the government wanted him or her to do so, the government
could have simply forced the director out. Moreover, the September 2008
deal explicitly required AIG to use “all reasonable efforts to cause the
composition of [the] board . . . to be . . . satisfactory to the Trust.”46 The
government’s voting power, and the express language of the agreement, both
strongly suggest that the government was behind the eight directors’
decisions to resign or decline to stand for reelection.
Turning from departures to additions, AIG explicitly reported in its
proxy statement for the 2009 shareholder meeting that “the U.S. Treasury in
connection with transactions entered into between AIG and the New York
Fed[eral Reserve Bank]” had recommended two of the eleven 2009 director

40. As a Delaware corporation, AIG’s organic documents and applicable law permitted the
board itself to fill vacant seats. AIG 2008 Annual Report, supra note 28, at cover page; see also
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 223(a)(1) (2010); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Ex.
3.1 (Jan. 17, 2008) (amending Bylaws section 2.2 to conform to the statute) [hereinafter AIG
Bylaws].
41. Between the 2008 and 2009 shareholder meetings, the AIG board voted three new directors
onto the board, with two of them voted on after September 22, 2008. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current
Report (Form 8-K) (July 17, 2008) (stating Johnson elected to the board by the board); Am. Int’l
Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 24, 2008) (stating the new CEO Edward Liddy elected
to the board by the board); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 13, 2008) (stating
Dammerman elected to the board by the board).
42. AIG 2009 Proxy Statement, supra note 28, at 13–15.
43. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 201 (Aug. 6, 2008).
44. AIG 2009 Proxy Statement, supra note 28, at 13–15.
45. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2011).
46. AIG Change of Control Credit Agreement, supra note 17, at 43 (§ 5.11).
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nominees—including the new CEO.47 These were the two directors who had
joined the board after the September 2008 deal, but before the next election,
and who were then nominated for shareholders to elect for a full term.48 The
proxy statement also said that five other director candidates were
recommended by the trustees of the government-formed Trust that held the
stock that the government had bought from AIG.49
In short, we can infer with considerable confidence that the government
sent the majority of the AIG board packing after taking voting control. We
know for certain that the government picked seven new directors, and that,
after the 2009 election, those seven constituted a majority of an elevendirector board. The government seized—and then changed—the board,
installing its own choices as the majority.
4. Disclosure of the Government’s Role
In 2008 and 2009, AIG filed Forms 8-K disclosing that (i) the company
had signed the agreement to issue preferred stock with controlling voting
rights to the government; (ii) the government had formed the Trust to hold
the preferred stock; and (iii) AIG had issued the preferred stock to the
Trust.50 AIG attached the operative transaction documents to each of these
filings and, in each case, the company filed the Form 8-K within four
business days of the action the form reported.51 The public therefore knew,
in a timely manner, that the government had the power to control AIG’s
board membership. But none of those filings revealed the government’s role
in removing, or adding, particular directors to the AIG board. And, while
AIG also filed Forms 8-K to announce the resignation of sitting directors
between the September 22, 2008 deal and the 2009 elections, and the
election to the board (by the board) of new directors during that period, none
of those Forms 8-K mentioned any government role in those individual
goings or comings.52 Moreover, the government itself filed no document
with the SEC to disclose any role it played in any director change at AIG.
It was only in its publicly filed May 21 preliminary and June 5 final
proxy statements for the director election at the 2009 shareholder meeting
that AIG disclosed the role that the U.S. Treasury, the Federal Reserve Bank
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

AIG 2009 Proxy Statement, supra note 28, at 18.
Id.; see also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
AIG 2009 Proxy Statement, supra note 28, at 18.
See supra notes 17–27.
Id.
See supra notes 39, 41.
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of New York, and the Trust had played in recommending seven individuals,
identified by name, for AIG directorships.53
Five of these seven had never served on the board and were running for
initial election.54 The disclosure of government involvement in the selection
of these five was therefore timely because the government’s role was clear
before they joined the board.55 However, the proxy statement also revealed
that the government had recommended new CEO Liddy, who had joined the
board in September 2008,56 nearly eight months before the proxy statement
disclosure, and another director, who had joined the board in November
2008,57 nearly six months before the disclosure. And the proxy statement,
like the Forms 8-K before it,58 said nothing about government influence in
the departure of the eight directors who either left the AIG board between
September 2008 and the 2009 shareholder meeting, or declined to seek
reelection in 2009.59
In sum, the government made no securities filing revealing its role in the
AIG board change. Nor did AIG disclose—until it filed its proxy statement
for the 2009 election—the government’s actual role, as opposed to the
power that its voting control provided, in the selection of two directors
(including new CEO Liddy) who had been added to the board between the
2008 and 2009 director elections.
On the other hand, the AIG filings in September 2008 fully disclosed
that the government was obtaining majority voting power at the company,
and revealed at the same time that the deal with the government expressly
required that the AIG board be acceptable to the government.60 From that
timely reported transaction, any investor or other member of the public
might have fairly assumed that the government was playing a central role in
all decisions affecting the composition of the AIG board following the
September 2008 deal. Moreover, outside the SEC filings, the financial press
reported that the government ousted AIG’s sitting CEO and replaced him

53. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Preliminary Proxy Materials (Schedule 14A), at 18 (May 21, 2009).
Mr. Liddy and Mr. Dammerman were identified for the [AIG Nominating and
Governance Committee of the AIG board] by members of the U.S. government in
connection with the transactions entered into between AIG and the NY Fed and the
Department of the Treasury. Ms. Koellner and Messrs. Golub, Lynch, Martinez and
Miller were identified to the Committee by the trustees of the Trust [holding the stock
giving controlling voting power to the government].
Id.; see also AIG 2009 Proxy Statement, supra note 28, at 18.
54. See AIG 2009 Proxy Statement, supra note 28, at 18.
55. See id.
56. See supra note 41.
57. Id. This other director was Dennis Dammerman.
58. See supra notes 39, 41.
59. See the preliminary and final proxy statements cited supra note 53.
60. See supra notes 19, 21, 25 and accompanying text.
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with Liddy—providing that information as those events unfolded.61
Simply put, there were “holes” in the disclosure of government
influence over AIG’s board change, but investors were by no means left
entirely in the dark.
B. Bank of America
BofA presents a very different case than does AIG because, although the
government bought stock in BofA, that stock did not provide voting rights,
and the government effected board change through regulatory action rather
than through voting power.62 This section begins with the government’s
investment in BofA,63 then describes the government’s regulatory move.64 It
proceeds next to the board change65 and evaluates whether that change likely
resulted from the regulatory action or other events.66 This section finishes

61. Willumstad left the CEO position and the board, and Liddy was appointed the CEO and
elected to the board on September 18, 2008. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept.
24, 2008). While the AIG securities filings at the time did not disclose the government’s hand in this
change, the financial press reported that Treasury Secretary Paulson had personally asked
Willumstad to step down as CEO and had tapped Liddy to succeed him.
As part of the [first bailout] deal, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson insisted that AIG’s
chief executive, Robert Willumstad, step aside. Mr. Paulson personally told Mr.
Willumstad the news in a phone call on Tuesday, according to a person familiar with the
call.
....
Mr. Willumstad, who recently took over as AIG’s chief executive to try to turn around
the firm, was surprised by the request. “If that’s what you want, I’ll do it,” he said to Mr.
Paulson, according to a person familiar with the call. AIG’s board was unhappy with the
decision but felt it had no choice but to go along, as the only other option was
bankruptcy.
....
By tapping Mr. Liddy as AIG’s next CEO, the government is turning to someone with
deep experience in the insurance industry . . . .
Matthew Karnitschnig et al., U.S. to Take Over AIG in $85 Billion Bailout, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16,
2008, at A1. The day after the changes, the financial press reported that Treasury Secretary Paulson
had “asked Mr. Liddy to step in at AIG.” Liam Pleven, The Financial Crisis: AIG’s New Chief Sees
Smaller, Nimbler Firm, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2008, at A3.
62. See infra Parts II.B.1–II.B.4.
63. See infra Part II.B.1.
64. See infra Part II.B.2.
65. See infra Part II.B.3.
66. See infra Part II.B.4.
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the BofA case study by describing the woefully inadequate securities
filings.67
1. The Government’s Shareholder Interest
On October 26, 2008, the U.S. Treasury agreed to pay $15 billion to
Bank of America for Series N Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred
Stock and a warrant to purchase more than 73 million shares of the bank’s
common stock.68 On January 9, 2009, the Treasury agreed to pay another
$10 billion to the bank, this time to purchase Series Q Fixed Rate
Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, and to replace the earlier warrant
with one to purchase almost 122 million shares of common stock.69 On
January 15, 2009, the Treasury agreed to pay an additional $20 billion to buy
Series R Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock and a warrant to
purchase an additional 150 million shares of common stock.70
The preferred stock did not provide the government with even a single
vote in director elections, unless BofA missed the mandatory dividend
payments on the stock,71 which never happened. And the warrants provided
no voting rights.72 Moreover, in December 2009, BofA repurchased from
the government all of the Series N, Series Q, and Series R preferred stock.73
67. See infra Part II.B.5.
68. Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 30, 2008) [hereinafter First BofA
Bailout 8-K].
69. Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Second BofA
Bailout 8-K]. The Treasury had contemplated buying $10 billion of preferred stock to be issued by
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. (Merrill). Since BofA bought Merrill, the government bought the stock
from BofA. At the same time, the government substituted, for its initial BofA warrant, a warrant
entitling it to buy more BofA common stock. Id.
70. Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Jan. 22, 2009) [hereinafter Third BofA
Bailout 8-K].
71. In each case, the preferred stock carried the right to elect two directors if the bank missed six
dividend payments, and the shares carried the right to vote as a class on mergers and on certain other
matters, such as issuance by the bank of stock senior to the preferred stock the government was
buying. First BofA Bailout 8-K, supra note 68, at Ex. 3.1 A-8-9 (§ 7(b) & (c)) (Certificate of
Designations of Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series N); Second BofA Bailout
8-K, supra note 69, at Ex. 3.1 A-8-9 (§ 7(b) & (c)) (Certificate of Designations of Fixed Rate
Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock, Series Q); Third BofA Bailout 8-K, supra note 70, at Ex. 3.1
A-7-8 (§ 7(b) & (c)) (Certificate of Designations of Fixed Rate Cumulative Perpetual Preferred
Stock, Series R). But the preferred shares carried no voting rights other than the limited and specific
ones set out in the deal documents. First BofA Bailout 8-K, supra note 68, at Ex. 3.1 A-7 (§ 7(a));
Second BofA Bailout 8-K, supra note 69, at Ex. 3.1 A-7 (§ 7(a)); Third BofA Bailout 8-K, supra
note 70, at Ex. 3.1 A-7 (§ 7(a)).
72. First BofA Bailout 8-K, supra note 68, at Ex. 4.2 (§ 6) (Warrant to Purchase Common
Stock); Third BofA Bailout 8-K, supra note 70, at Ex. 4.2 (§ 6) (Warrant to Purchase Common
Stock).
73. BofA announced on December 2, 2009 that it would repurchase all of the stock sold to the
government. Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 3, 2009). On December 9, BofA
reported that it had completed repurchasing all of that stock. Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report
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The government then sold the warrants—which it had never exercised—in
March 2010.74 Thus, unlike the AIG case, the government never had any
formal corporate power to dictate the composition of the BofA board.
2. The Government’s Regulatory Action
The government’s lack of voting power, however, did not prevent it
from pressuring BofA to change its board. BofA is a bank holding
company.75 It is therefore regulated by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (the Fed).76 Among the Fed’s many regulatory tools
is the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which the Fed can effectively
force upon any bank holding company. The Fed describes its MOUs as
“highly structured, written but informal, agreements that are signed by both
the Reserve Bank and the [regulated] bank’s board of directors.”77 The Fed
uses MOUs “when a bank has multiple deficiencies” but “circumstances
warrant a less severe response than those provided by formal supervisory
actions.”78
The financial press reported that BofA and federal bank regulators had
entered into an MOU in early May 2009,79 after the bailout investment and
before BofA repurchased the preferred stock. According to the Wall Street
Journal, the MOU required BofA “to overhaul its board.”80 As set out

(Form 8-K), at Item 8.01(b) (Dec. 9, 2009).
74. Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 3 (Mar. 9, 2010).
75. Bank of Am. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Feb. 27, 2009).
76. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(q)(3)(F) (Supp. V 2011).
77. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, COMMERCIAL BANK EXAMINATION MANUAL, FORMAL AND
INFORMAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS § 5040.1, at 6 (Nov. 2003), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cbem/200904/5000.pdf [hereinafter FED. BANK
EXAMINATION MANUAL].
78. Id. Examples of formal disciplinary sanctions include (i) cease-and-desist orders issued
when, for example, a bank is violating the law or engaging in an unsound banking practice, id. §
5040.1 at 1, 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (2006); and (ii) removal of officers or other affiliated parties at
banks when, for example, those officers or other affiliated parties have violated the law, engaged in
unsafe and unsound practices, or violated fiduciary duties and that conduct has or probably will hurt
the bank financially, and the acts of the officers or other affiliated parties involve dishonesty, 12
U.S.C. § 1818(e) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). See also FED. BANK EXAMINATION MANUAL, § 5040.1 at
1, 3.
79. Dan Fitzpatrick, U.S. Regulators to BofA: Obey or Else, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2009, at C1
[hereinafter Fitzpatrick, Obey] (reporting that “[t]he order was imposed in early May”).
80. Id. (“[BofA] is operating under a secret regulatory sanction that requires it to overhaul its
board . . . .”). A later story details some of the inside-government history leading to the MOU.
Carrick Mollenkamp & Dan Fitzpatrick, With Feds, BofA’s Lewis Met His Match, WALL ST. J., Nov.
9, 2009, at A16. Although the MOU never surfaced publicly, the reliability of the paper publishing
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below, that Wall Street Journal report did not repeat information provided
by a securities filing, for no such filing revealed the MOU.81 And the story
did not break until July 2009—weeks after the government had put the
MOU in place.82
3. The Board Change
As with AIG, understanding the government’s impact on board
composition at BofA requires us to look back at the board as it existed
before the government intervened. Thus, at BofA’s April 29, 2009 annual
meeting—less than a month before the government regulatory action—
shareholders elected eighteen directors.83 All of them were incumbents.84
Almost immediately thereafter, the government and BofA signed the
MOU, and the newly elected board quickly and drastically changed. Within
two months, nine—fully half—of the recently elected eighteen directors
resigned.85 By the end of September, six new directors—all elected to the
board by the sitting directors—joined the board.86 This left fifteen directors
on the board, and the company reduced its board size to that number.87 The
CEO, Ken Lewis, thereafter left his executive position and vacated his board

the stories about it, the granularity of the second story’s account describing the run-up to the MOU,
and the fact that BofA did, indeed, change half its board shortly after reports that the MOU was
signed make, together, a very convincing case that the MOU existed and required the bank to change
a considerable number of its directors.
81. See Fitzpatrick, Obey, supra note 79 (referring to the MOU as a “secret regulatory
sanction”). Review of BofA securities filings on Forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K after May 2009 reveals
no reference to the MOU.
82. Supra note 79.
83. Bank of Am. Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 211 (Aug. 7, 2009) [hereinafter BofA
2009 2Q 10-Q].
84. Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 15–17 (Mar. 18, 2010).
85. Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 29, 2009) (announcing Sloan
resignation); Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 4, 2009) (announcing Tillman
resignation); Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 8, 2009) (announcing Ward and
Mitchell resignations); Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 19, 2009) (announcing
Prueher and Franks resignations); Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (July 31, 2009)
(announcing Collins, Barnet, and Countryman resignations).
86. As at AIG, the bank’s organic documents and applicable law permitted the board itself to fill
vacant seats. Bank of Am. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Feb. 27, 2009) [hereinafter
BofA 2009 Annual Report] (“Bank of America Corporation . . . is a Delaware corporation.”); see
also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 223(a)(1) (2011) (a vacancy on the board may be filled by vote of a
majority of directors in office at time of the vacancy); Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8K), at Ex. 3.2 (Dec. 15, 2008) [hereinafter BofA Bylaws] (amended and restated Bylaws, Art. IV § 4
conforming to § 223); Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (June 5) (stating Bies,
Boardman, Jones, and Powell elected to the board by the board); Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report
(Form 8-K) (August 21, 2009) (stating Scully elected to the board by the board); Bank of Am. Corp.,
Current Report (Form 8-K) (September 21, 2009) (stating Holliday elected to the board by the
board).
87. Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at Ex. 99.1 (Sept. 21, 2009).
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seat.88 The board replaced Lewis with a new top executive, Brian
Moynihan, and the sitting directors elected Moynihan to the board.89
The company then reduced the number of directors to thirteen, effective
at the 2010 annual meeting, and two of the fifteen incumbent directors did
not stand for reelection.90 The thirteen 2010 nominees—all sitting directors,
by virtue of the departures and arrivals between the 2009 and 2010
elections—ran successfully for reelection at the 2010 annual shareholder
meeting.91 After that 2010 election, only six directors remained from the
original eighteen who had been elected in 2009, shortly before the MOU.92
And those six now constituted a minority. As the MOU reportedly directed,
BofA had “overhauled” its board.93
4. The Government’s Role in the Change
Because the board that the shareholders elected in 2010 was the board
that was reconstituted by director departures and arrivals between the 2009
and 2010 elections, this section concentrates on those departures and those
arrivals. The section considers departures first. It considers arrivals second.
Ten BofA directors resigned between the 2009 and 2010 shareholder
meetings (the nine who left shortly after the MOU and the CEO who left
later), and two declined to run for reelection.94 The government reportedly
did not pressure the bank to push out CEO Ken Lewis,95 and the two
directors who declined to run for reelection did so long after the May 2009
MOU.96 So it is the nine directors who left between the early May MOU and

88. Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 1, 2009) (noting that CEO Lewis
advised the board that he would vacate both his executive and board positions effective January 31,
2009).
89. Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 17, 2009) (announcing Brian
Moynihan elevated to chief executive and elected to the board by the board).
90. Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 17 (Mar. 17, 2010) [hereinafter
BofA 2010 Proxy Statement]. A comparison of the board before the election, id. at 10, with those
standing for reelection, id. at 21, shows that directors Massey and Ryan did not seek reelection.
91. Id. at 17–21; Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 3, 2010).
92. Compare BofA 2009 2Q 10-Q, at 211 with Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K)
(May 3, 2010).
93. Fitzpatrick, Obey, supra notes 79–80.
94. See supra notes 85, 88, 90.
95. Louise Story & Eric Dash, Ending Rocky Tenure, Chief Is to Leave Bank of America, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2009, at B1 (“[While] regulators have urged other management and board level
changes at Bank of America,” “[f]ederal officials did not call on Mr. Lewis to step down.”). All
New York Times citations are to the Late Edition.
96. BofA 2010 Proxy Statement, supra note 90.
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the end of July whose departure the government seems to have prompted.
Of course, it is possible that these nine directors departed for reasons
other than government pressure. The directors may have resigned, in part, to
avoid controversy. BofA’s 2009 election was contentious, with advocacy
groups and longtime shareholders urging votes against incumbents
(particularly CEO Ken Lewis),97 on ballots that permitted a vote “for” or
“against” each director candidate even though each ran unopposed.98 As a
result, the percentage of shares voted “for” several of the incumbents
constituted, for corporate elections,99 an extremely low percentage of the
total votes cast.100 The stockholders also approved a resolution,101 which the
incumbent board opposed, to separate the board chair position from that of
the CEO,102 thereby stripping CEO Lewis of his chairmanship.103 That

97. Louise Story, Investors Air Discontent With Bank of America, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2009, at
B1 (stating that (i) two proxy advisory services—RiskMetrics Group and Glass, Lewis and
Company—recommended voting against Ken Lewis, the CEO and board chair; (ii) CtW Investment
Group, which works with union pension funds, led a campaign to vote against Lewis; and (iii) the
Finger family, longstanding BofA shareholders, set up a website and broadcast television
commercials encouraging votes against Lewis).
98. See Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at Proxy Card (Mar. 18, 2009)
[hereinafter BofA 2009 Proxy Statement].
Federal regulations require that a proxy form to vote shares in a director election “shall
clearly provide . . . [one of several defined] means for security holders to withhold the authority to
vote for each nominee,” or, “[i]f applicable state law gives legal effect to votes cast against a
nominee,” the proxy form may “provide a . . . means for security holders to vote against each
nominee” either instead of, or in addition to, the opportunity to withhold votes for the nominee. 17
C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(b)(2), Instruc. 2 (2012).
99. In a sample of 2488 shareholder meetings in 2003 through 2005, 94.27% of shares voting
were cast for director nominees on average. Jie Cai et al., Electing Directors, 64 J. OF FIN. 2389,
2397 Table 1 (2009).
100. As examples, from BofA 2009 2Q 10-Q, supra note 83, at 211:
Shares
Shares Voted For
Shares Voted Against
Abstaining
Name
Number (Percent)
Number (Percent)
Number
(Percent)
Kenneth D.
3,585,483,520
1,739,904,717
82,576,830
Lewis
(66.30%)
(32.17%)
(1.53%)
Monica C.
4,022,922,490
1,316,622,875
68,419,702
Lozano
(74.39%)
(24.35%)
(1.27%)
O. Temple
3,330,503,450
1,990,078,420
87,383,197
Sloan, Jr.
(61.59%)
(36.80%)
(1.62%)
Robert L.
4,040,832,297
1,299,812,405
67,320,365
Tillman
(74.72%)
(24.04%)
(1.24%)
Jackie M.
3,833,873,175
1,506,235,467
67,856,425
Ward
(70.89%)
(27.85%)
(1.25%)
101.
102.
103.
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resolution created a public stir,104 and board members may have viewed the
vote on that resolution as a rebuke.
Another possibility is that directors departed in 2009 due to the
continuing controversy surrounding BofA’s acquisition of Merrill Lynch
through a deal signed on September 15, 2008105 and approved by the
shareholders on December 5.106 That acquisition produced shareholder
unrest for three reasons. First, Merrill advised—after BofA shareholders
voted in favor of the merger but before the transaction closed—that Merrill’s
losses were dramatically higher than previously estimated, but the BofA
board and management proceeded with the deal nevertheless.107 Second,
Merrill paid about $3.6 billion in bonuses shortly before the merger, drawing
criticism both because the bonuses appeared too generous for a then-failing
company to pay108 and because the proxy statement urging BofA
shareholders to approve the merger had not disclosed the bonus payments.109
Third, Merrill’s former CEO resigned from his post-merger position at BofA
amid stories that he had engineered the just-before-merger bonuses and had
ostentatiously redecorated his office.110 All of this may have worn down
BofA directors and motivated their departure.
Finally, it is possible that public criticism of the board caused some or
all of the nine to leave. Press articles claimed that the BofA board was too
“independent” director within the meaning of the New York Stock Exchange listing standards. Id. at
52. A CEO is not independent under those standards. NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra
note 31, § 303A.02(b)(i).
104. See, e.g., Louise Story, Big Loss for Lewis, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2009, at B1 (stating that
“[Lewis was dealt] a stinging blow that leaves his stewardship and legacy in doubt” by a vote “[a]t a
contentious annual . . . meeting” in which “angry investors held him accountable for what they view
as a series of missteps that forced the once-mighty bank to accept . . . government bailouts”).
105. Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Nov. 12, 2008).
106. Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Dec. 5, 2008).
107. See Julie Creswell, Price Paid for Merrill Is Rising, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2009, at B1.
108. Aaron Smith, Watchdog blasts Merrill bonuses, CNN MONEY, Feb. 11, 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/02/11/news/companies/merrill_bonuses/index.htm (reporting the New
York Attorney General asking: “What did they do to deserve that money?” given that Merrill “has
failed”); see Michael J. de la Merced & Louise Story, Nearly 700 at Merrill In Million-Dollar Club,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2009, at B1 (noting that the New York Attorney General “raised hackles by
disclosing how Merrill Lynch distributed its 2008 bonus” and “criticized Merrill for moving up the
bonus payments to December, just before shareholders approved the merger [with BofA], instead of
the usual time in January”).
109. See Complaint ¶¶ 2–3, SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 09CV06829 (Aug. 3, 2009), 2009
WL 2364171; see also SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 09 Civ. 6829(JSR), 10 Civ. 0215(JSR), 2010
WL 624581, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010).
110. Louise Story & Julie Creswell, Love Was Blind, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2009, § 3 (Money and
Business), at 1 (referring to “Mr. Thain’s lavish $1.2 million office renovation and last-minute
bonuses that he paid out to Merrill employees days before the deal [with BofA] closed”).
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close to the CEO.111 Such criticism may have hit particularly hard because
BofA’s stock price dropped even more precipitously than stock prices of the
company’s peers.112
Since the nine board resignations started in May 2009,113 however, the
timing tells. These directors had already pulled through the awful wave of
publicity surrounding the Merrill merger, and through the fractious April
2009 shareholder meeting.114 The fact that they began resigning shortly after
the MOU was signed led the Wall Street Journal to characterize the bank as
having “responded swiftly” to the MOU by sending these directors out the
door.115 Given the timing and press reports, the most persuasive inference is
that the government—acting through its regulatory power rather than
through its shareholding power—had a hand in the nine director departures
in May through July of 2009.
Less clear is what role the government played in the arrival of the seven
new board members between the 2009 and 2010 elections. BofA stated in

111. Louise Story & Julie Creswell, Bank of America Board Under Gun From Critics, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 28, 2009, at B1.
112.
Value of $1 Invested on
Value of $1 Invested on
9/30/08 in CapitalizationDate
9/30/08 in BofA stock
Weighted Index of Peer
Companies
9/30/08
1.00
1.00
12/31/08
.41
.66
4/29/09
(date of director election at
.25
.60
annual meeting)
5/29/09
(date of first director
.69
.33
resignation after MOU)
7/31/09
(date of last director
.43
.71
resignation in waive after
MOU)
The peer companies used in this computation were Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, BB&T
Corporation, Citigroup, Inc., Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., JP Morgan Chase & Co., KeyCorp,
Morgan Stanley, State Street Corporation, U.S. Bancorp, SunTrust Banks, Inc., and Wells Fargo &
Company.
113. O. Temple Sloan, Jr. resigned first. Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May
29, 2009); see supra note 85.
114. See David Ellis, Ken Lewis out as BofA chairman, CNN MONEY, Apr. 29, 2009,
http://money.cnn.com/2009/04/29/news/companies/bofa_shareholders/ (noting that “[v]otes at
annual shareholder meetings usually do not reach [that] level of controversy” and “several investors
were not shy about making known their feelings about . . . the past year”).
115. The Wall Street Journal article reported that BofA had “responded swiftly” to the MOU,
“with six directors resigning since May 26.” Fitzpatrick, Obey, supra note 79. Three more departed
shortly after this July 16, 2009 article appeared. See supra note 85.
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its 2010 proxy statement that one special committee of the board had found
six of the seven directors appointed during that time, with the help of
“outside legal counsel and third-party advisors,”116 and that a second special
committee had identified the seventh new board member, the new CEO.117
The proxy statement did not describe or refer to any government role in
selecting any of these directors. At least one story in the financial press,
however, reported that the government had effectively exercised a veto
power over the selection of the new chief executive.118
5. Disclosure of the Government’s Role
As an “informal supervisory action,” an MOU is “not published or
publicly available,” although according to the Fed a bank “may” have to
disclose an MOU in the bank’s securities filings.119 Here, BofA did not
include, describe, or even refer to its MOU in any SEC filing.120 And the
government filed no disclosure document with the Commission setting out
the government’s role in the bank’s board turnover. In short, within a few
months of shareholders electing a board at one of the largest financial
institutions in the country, the government reportedly removed half of the
directors and played a role, as well, in the selection of the bank’s new CEO,
with no securities filing revealing the government role at all.121
The absence of any such filing grates, particularly when comparing
BofA to AIG. At AIG, the market could have anticipated direct and
conclusive government intervention in board composition, resulting from the
publicly disclosed shift in voting control to the Treasury-created Trust.122
But the government held no voting stock at BofA whatsoever.123 Instead of
using publicly disclosed voting control, the government at BofA exercised

116. BofA 2010 Proxy Statement, supra note 90, at 6, 17.
117. Id. at 8.
118. Dan Fitzpatrick & Michael R. Crittenden, BofA to Select Emergency CEO, WALL ST. J., Oct.
5, 2009, at C3 (reporting that one BofA board committee was trying to select a possible replacement
for Lewis if legal actions forced his quick departure and stating that “[r]egulators will be asked to
sign off on the choice,” with “[a] separate Bank of America board committee formed on Friday . . .
sifting through possible successors for Mr. Lewis, with the change to occur at year end . . . “; further
reporting that “a narrowed list of candidates [assembled by this second committee] will be presented
to the U.S. government for review. . . .”).
119. FED. BANK EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 77, § 5040.1 at 6.
120. See supra note 81.
121. See supra notes 76–118 and accompanying text.
122. Supra note 19 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 71 and 72 and accompanying text.
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its control by the publicly unavailable MOU, which only came to light
through a reporter’s diligence, and then only weeks after the document was
in place.124 Without the news reports on the MOU, no investor would have
known that the government muscled half the BofA board out the door. Even
with the press reports, the market learned of the government involvement
late.
III. HOLES IN SECURITIES LAW REPORTING THAT PERMIT GOVERNMENT
CONTROL OF BOARDS TO REMAIN IN THE DARK
With the AIG and BofA cases set out and the deficiencies in securities
filings identified, we turn now to a central puzzle: how was it that the
government could change the boards at huge, publicly traded companies
without timely and complete securities filings describing the government’s
maneuvers? Securities law recognizes the importance of board change,
imposing multiple requirements to disclose not only director departures and
arrivals, but also plans to change board composition by major shareholders,
shifts in control that could affect board composition, and even the names of
those who recommend candidates for director seats at a shareholder
election.125 This section sets out these disclosure requirements, explains why
they left disclosure “holes” in the AIG and BofA board change cases, and
shows why investors (and the wider public) had some information to “fill in
the blanks” at AIG, but not at BofA.
A. Tender Offer Disclosure
A party tendering for shares of a company may well wish to acquire, by
the tender, a sufficient block of shares to change the board of directors—
either so that a reconstituted board will favor a full takeover by the tendering
party or so that the company will make business changes that will increase
the value of the stock that the tendering party owns. Any party making a
tender offer for stock of a public company must, if consummation of the
tender would leave that tendering party with more than five percent of the
company’s stock, file a Schedule TO.126 That Schedule TO—the basic
tender offer disclosure document—must include “any plans, proposals or
negotiations that relate to or would result in . . . [a]ny change in the present
board of directors.”127 Since the government never made a tender offer for

124.
125.
126.
127.
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AIG or BofA stock, government action at those companies never triggered
this “Schedule TO Disclosure.”
B. More-Than-Five-Percent Equity Shareholder Disclosure
Any shareholder, or group of shareholders, acquiring more than five
percent of any class of an “equity security” that is registered under section
12 of the Securities Exchange Act must file a Schedule 13D.128 That
Schedule 13D must include “any plans or proposals which the reporting
persons may have which relate to or would result in . . . [a]ny change in the
present board of directors.”129 A first look suggests that this “Schedule 13D
Disclosure” would have required the government to reveal its efforts to
change the boards at AIG and BofA and, indeed, even its plans to undertake
those efforts. But closer examination shows that the government was able—
quite legally—to avoid any such obligation.
Consider first the AIG case. The government purchased all of the Series
C Convertible Participating Preferred Stock that AIG sold.130 Even
assuming that the Series C stock constituted a distinct “class”131 of an AIG
equity security so that the government owned 100% of that class, the
government was not obligated to make a Schedule 13D Disclosure for two
reasons. First, Exchange Act section 3(c) states that no provision of the Act
applies to “any executive department or independent establishment of the
United States . . . or any officer, agent, or employee of any such department
[or] establishment” unless that provision specifically states that it so
applies.132 Since section 13(d) does not specifically state that it applies to the

128. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)(1), 78m(d)(3) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1(a),
240.13d-101 (2012).
129. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (Item 4(d)).
130. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Sept. 26, 2008).
131. Section 13 contains no definition of a “class” of security. Since section 13 refers to section
12(g), which defines “class” “for purposes of [that] subsection” to mean “all securities of an issuer
which are of substantially similar character and the holders of which enjoy substantially similar
rights,” 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(5) (2006), a section 13 “class” might be defined in that same way.
Alternatively, a “class” might be defined by “the common usage of the day in the legal and financial
worlds.” Ellerin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 270 F.2d 259, 262 (2d Cir. 1959). Either way, a stock
is a separate “class” if it has sufficiently important unique characteristics, including voting rights.
Surely, the preferred stock that AIG sold to the government (which handed over voting control of the
company) was a separate “class” for section 13(d). And the labeling of that stock as a “series”
instead of a “class” should not affect the analysis. For an analogy, see 17 C.F.R. § 240.12d1-1(d)
(2012) (“If a class of a security is issuable in two or more series with different terms, each such
series shall be deemed a separate class for the purposes of this section.”).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(c) (2006).
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government,133 the government had no Schedule 13D Disclosure obligation,
provided that the Trust holding the AIG stock for the government fit within
the phrase “any executive department or independent establishment of the
United States.”134
That proviso posed no problem. Since the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York created the Trust and the Trust held the AIG stock for the sole
benefit of the U.S. Treasury,135 the Trust almost certainly qualified as an
“independent establishment of the United States.”136 The courts interpret
section 3(c) as applying to the Federal Reserve137 and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC).138 Neither the Federal Reserve nor the FDIC
seems closer to the section 3(c) description of protected entities than a trust
established by the executive for the sole benefit of an executive department.
Section 3(c) therefore applied, and cut the Schedule 13D Disclosure off at
the knees.
In addition, Schedule 13D Disclosure is required, with exceptions not
relevant here, only when the security that the shareholder owns is registered
pursuant to section 12 of the Exchange Act.139 AIG did not register the
Series C Convertible Participating Preferred under section 12 of the
Exchange Act140 and was not required to do so.141 Thus, the Schedule 13D

133. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d).
134. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(c).
135. AIG Credit Facility Trust Agreement, supra note 22, § 1.01 (providing that the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York “hereby establishes a trust designated as the AIG Credit Facility Trust
for the sole benefit of the [U.S.] Treasury”).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(c).
137. Howe v. Bank for Int’l Settlements, 194 F. Supp. 2d 6, 23–24 (D. Mass. 2002).
138. Colonial Bank & Trust Co. v. Am. Bankshares Corp., 439 F. Supp. 797, 802 (E.D. Wis.
1977).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
140. SEC, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 6 (2010) [hereinafter SEC Form 10-K], requires that
companies list on the cover of the Form those stocks that they have registered under sections 12(b)
and 12(g). AIG’s Form 10-Ks for 2008 and 2009 listed other securities that AIG had registered
under section 12, but did not list the Series C Convertible Participating Preferred. AIG 2008 Annual
Report, supra note 28; Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 26, 2010).
141. Section 12(a) of the Exchange Act prohibits brokers from effecting transactions on a
national exchange involving a security that is not registered under that Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a)
(2006). This effectively requires issuers to register a security under section 12(b) if it is listed on an
exchange. Id. § 78l(b). But the AIG Series C Preferred did not trade on any exchange.
Section 12(g) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 12g-1 required that a company register any
class of equity security if (i) the issuer had total assets in excess of $10 million and (ii) the record
owners of that class of security numbered 500 or more (since increased). 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g) (2006);
17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-1 (2009). Both before and after the government bought the Series C Preferred
on March 4, 2009, AIG had more than $10 million in assets. See Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Quarterly
Report (Form 10-Q), at 3 (May 7, 2009) (reporting more than $819 billion in assets on Mar. 31,
2009); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 3 (Aug. 7, 2009) (reporting more than
$830 billion on June 30, 2009); Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 3 (Nov. 6,
2009) (reporting more than $844 billion on Sept. 30, 2009). But the government was the only
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Disclosure obligation would not have applied to the government, by reason
of its ownership of the Series C stock, even if section 3(c) had not
categorically precluded the application of section 13 to Uncle Sam.
Turning from the AIG case to the BofA case, the government’s case for
making no Schedule 13D Disclosure was even stronger. Again assume that
each series of preferred stock that the government bought from BofA
constituted a separate “class” for section 13(d) analysis (with the Treasury
owning 100% of each such class).142 Even so, the section 3(c) exemption
relieved the government of any Schedule 13D Disclosure obligation.143
Moreover, BofA—like AIG—did not have to register the governmentpurchased preferred stock under Exchange Act section 12 and did not
register that stock under that section, which meant that section 13(d) did not
apply to the owner of that stock.144 Finally, the preferred stock that the
government bought from BofA provided no voting rights unless BofA
missed dividend payments owed on that stock.145 Since BofA never missed
dividend payments, that BofA preferred stock never had a current vote in

purchaser of the Series C—far below the 500 minimum necessary to trigger a section 12(g)
registration.
142. Whether a series of preferred stock constitutes a separate “class” depends on its unique
characteristics. See supra note 131. Arguably, the Series N and Series R preferred stock that the
government purchased from the bank constituted a separate “class” because that stock uniquely
subjected the bank’s compensation to federal government control. First BofA Bailout 8-K, supra
note 68, Ex. 3.1 Annex A § 4.10 (series N designations, requiring BofA to “take all necessary steps
to ensure that its Benefit Plans with respect to Senior Executive Officers comply in all respects with
§ 111(b) of the [Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat.
3765] as implemented by any guidance or regulation . . . that has been issued and is in effect as of
the Closing Date”); Third BofA Bailout 8-K, supra note 70, Ex. 10.1 § 4.10 (Stock Purchase
Agreement, including the same requirement as the series N designation); see BofA 2010 Proxy
Statement, supra note 90, at 28 (reporting that the “amount and form” of compensation paid to
certain bank executives was subject to specific federal approval).
143. The argument for the section 3(c) exclusion is even stronger in the BofA case, since the
Treasury itself, rather than a trust, owned the BofA stock. See supra text accompanying notes 68–
70.
144. The covers to BofA’s Forms 10-K for the years 2008 and 2009 list other securities that the
company had registered under section 12 but not the Series N, Q, or R Fixed Rate Cumulative
Perpetual Preferred Stock issued to the government. Bank of Am. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10K) (Feb. 27, 2009); Bank of Am. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 26, 2010).
Just as the federal securities laws did not require AIG to register the preferred stock it sold to
the government, those laws did not require BofA to register the preferred stock that BofA sold to the
United States. Only one shareholder owned the preferred series that the government bought from the
bank, so the section 12(g) registration requirement—triggered in part by 500 or more shareholders of
record—did not apply. See supra note 141. Further, the BofA Series N and R preferred stock did
not trade on any exchange, and hence did not need registration under sections 12(a) or (b).
145. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
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director elections and was accordingly never an “equity security”146 falling
within the coverage of section 13(d) at all.
C. Form 8-K Disclosure
Form 8-K requires public companies to disclose any of more than
twenty different events shortly after they occur.147 Three of the described
events are particularly pertinent here.
1. Director Change
Within four business days of a director’s resignation or refusal to stand
for reelection, a public company must file a Form 8-K disclosing that fact.148
Moreover, when a director resigns or declines to stand for reelection
“because of a disagreement with [the company on whose board he or she
sits] . . . on any matter relating to the [company’s] operations, policies, or
practices,” 149 the company not only must disclose the departure or refusal,
but must also describe the disagreement.150 Here, AIG and BofA dutifully
reported director departures but did not, in any of the filings, report any
“disagreement” between the board member heading offstage and the
company over company “operations, policies[,] or practices.”151 There easily
could have been none, even if the government pressed the director to leave.
The director might have simply agreed to leave for the good of the company,
reasoning that the company needed government financial or regulatory
support (or both) and that, if leaving would improve the chance of that
support, then leaving was the right thing to do. In that case, even if the
director disagreed with the government that he or she should leave, any such
disagreement might have been appropriately characterized as no
disagreement with the company, and thus not subject to mandatory reporting
in an 8-K filing. A good argument for this position—whether it necessarily
would have survived scrutiny before a court or the SEC—could have been
enough to convince AIG or BofA that none of the directors left as a result of
any such “disagreement.”152
Putting it another way, the Form 8-K director change disclosure—
146. SEC rules exclude “non-voting securities” from the definition of “equity securities,” and
define “voting securities” as those “the holders of which are presently entitled to vote for the election
of directors.” 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1(i), 240.12b-2 (2012) (emphasis added).
147. SEC, Current Report (Form 8-K) (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form
8-k.pdf [hereinafter SEC Form 8-K].
148. Id. at Item 5.02(a)–(b), General Instruction B.1.
149. Id. at Item 5.02(a).
150. Id. at Item 5.02(a)(1)(iii).
151. See the Form 8-Ks identified in notes 39, 85 supra.
152. SEC, Current Report (Form 8-K) at Item 5.02(a)(1).
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though broadly phrased to pick up intra-company controversy leading to a
director departure—simply does not contemplate influence from outside the
company to remove a director. In the private sphere, outside pressure to
remove directors might come from a large shareholder or perhaps a hostile
bidder making a tender offer. The Schedule 13D Disclosure and the
Schedule TO Disclosure would, respectively, require those private actors to
disclose plans to change the board and thereby make up for any deficiency in
the 8-K disclosure.153 But, as we have seen, neither of those shareholder
disclosure mandates applied to the government’s actions at AIG or BofA.
In addition to director departures, Form 8-K requires public companies
to disclose, within four days, the election by the board of new directors who
join the board between shareholder meetings.154 This disclosure must
include “a brief description of any arrangement or understanding between
the new director and any other persons, naming such persons, pursuant to
which such director was selected as a director.”155 None of the Forms 8-K
announcing new directors who joined the AIG or BofA boards between
shareholder meetings included any statement about any such “arrangement
or understanding.”156 Of course, the government could have had an
“arrangement or understanding”157 with the company (AIG or BofA)
pursuant to which the new director joined the board. But Form 8-K
identifies the only reportable “arrangement or understanding” as one
between “any other person[]” and “the new director.”158
2. Material Definitive Agreement
A public company must file a Form 8-K to disclose, within four days,
the company’s entry into a material definitive agreement that is not made in
the ordinary course of business.159 AIG and BofA filed Forms 8-K to
comply with this requirement when those companies entered into the deals
by which the government bought the preferred stock issued by each of those
corporations.160 Both AIG and BofA attached the deal documents to their

153. See supra Parts III.A., III.B., III.C.1.
154. SEC Form 8-K, supra note 147 at Item 5.02(d).
155. Id. at Item 5.02(d)(2).
156. See the Forms 8-K identified in notes 41, 86 supra.
157. Supra note 155 and accompanying text.
158. Id.
159. SEC Form 8-K, supra note 147 at Item 1.01(a), General Instruction B.1.
160. When a company files a Form 8-K, that filing must “contain the number . . . of the
applicable item.” Id. at General Instruction D. The Forms 8-K that AIG and BofA filed to describe
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Forms 8-K and thereby fully disclosed all terms of the preferred stock that
the government bought.161
The full report of the AIG transaction—disclosing the shift of voting
power on all matters (including director elections) to the government and the
express statement in the deal documents that the AIG board must be
satisfactory to the trustees of the Trust that would hold the stock for the
government—was enough to signal that the government would control who
stayed on the AIG board, who left the board, and who joined that board.162
But the reports of the BofA transactions did nothing of the sort.163 The
government’s purchases of preferred stock from BofA provided no right to
even a single vote in director elections, unless the bank missed required
dividend payments.164 The warrants provided no voting rights at any time.165
Thus, by the transaction documents that BofA attached to its Forms 8-K,
investors could see that the stock and warrants did not provide voting rights
and, therefore, investors would not have gleaned from the description of
those investments that the government was effecting board change.
Moreover, neither company filed any “material definitive agreement”
Form 8-K that separately discussed government influence on the departure
or arrival of individual directors. Most important in this regard is BofA’s
failure to file an 8-K to disclose, as a material definitive agreement, the
existence and the terms of the MOU by which, according to press reports,
the bank agreed to radically reconfigure its board.166
Though at first consideration surprising, the bank’s decision against
such disclosure arguably complied with Form 8-K requirements. Form 8-K
defines a “material definitive agreement” as “an agreement that provides for
obligations that are material to and enforceable against the [company], or
rights that are material to the [company] and enforceable by the
[company].”167 An obligation to change the board of directors would be
“material” for all the reasons set out in Part IV.B below. But as an “informal
supervisory action,” the MOU was, in the Fed’s view, “not enforceable.”168

sales of preferred stock to the government stated that they were filed to comply with Item 1.01. See
the Forms 8-K identified in notes 17, 68–70 supra. Both companies also filed—for the bailout
transactions—Forms 8-K under Item 3.02 (requiring disclosure of the sale of unregistered
securities), Item 3.03 (requiring disclosure of events that materially modify the rights of existing
securities holders), and Item 5.03 (requiring disclosure of amendments to articles of incorporation).
See the Forms 8-K identified in notes 24, 68–70 supra.
161. See supra notes 17, 22, 24, 68–70.
162. Supra notes 19, 21 and accompanying text.
163. See supra Part II.B.5.
164. Supra note 71 and accompanying text.
165. Supra note 72 and accompanying text.
166. See supra Part II.B.5
167. SEC Form 8-K, supra note 147, at Item 1.01(b).
168. FED. BANK EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 77, § 5040.1 at 6.
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And, as an unenforceable agreement, it fell outside the 8-K definition of
“material definitive agreements.”169 Of course, as a practical matter, most
banks’ managements and boards will comply with a “supervisory action” by
its primary regulator, even if that action is “informal” and in some sense not
But by applying pressure through an MOU, the
“enforceable.”170
government (intentionally or not) armed the bank with a persuasive
argument that the Fed’s pressure to change the BofA board need not be
publicly reported.171 Disclosure was not clearly required.
3. Change of Control
A public company must file a Form 8-K within four business days after
its board or its officers learn that “a change in control . . . has occurred.”172
When it sold the voting stock to the government in March 2009, AIG filed a
Form 8-K pursuant to this requirement.173 But BofA never filed such a Form
8-K to disclose the control that the government exercised by the MOU.174 It
is difficult to know why. The portion of Form 8-K concerning change of
control does focus in part on “the percentage of voting securities” owned by
the party taking control,175 and, as set out above, the government held no
securities with voting rights at the bank. But the securities law definition of
“control” is broad, extending expansively to power from any source,
whether exercised “through the ownership of voting securities, by contract,
or otherwise.”176 Perhaps BofA did not file a change of control Form 8-K
because the MOU affected only selected aspects of BofA’s operations and
governance, whereas control, as defined by the SEC, is arguably broader—
the “power to direct or cause the direction of the management and policies”
of a company.177 By this interpretation, or maybe because the MOU was not
“enforceable” and therefore perhaps could not provide “control,” a Form 8K to disclose the MOU as a change of control was arguably not required.

169. See SEC Form 8-K, supra note 147, at Item 1.01(b).
170. If the bank fails to comply, the Fed can impose other, mandatory, enforcement measures.
See supra note 78.
171. Obviously, if in another case the government applied pressure without an “agreement” at all,
the Form 8-K requirement to disclose material definitive agreements would not apply.
172. SEC Form 8-K, supra note 147, at Item 5.01(a), General Instruction B.1.
173. Am. Int’l Grp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 5, 2009).
174. See supra Part II.B.5.
175. SEC Form 8-K, supra note 147, at Item 5.01(a)(3).
176. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2012) (emphasis added).
177. Id.
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D. Proxy Disclosure
The federal proxy rules require that a company state how it came to
nominate a director candidate.178 Specifically, when the nominating
committee of a public company’s board puts forward a director candidate for
a vote at a shareholder meeting and the board seeks proxies to vote shares
for that nominee, the company must disclose “which one or more of the
following categories of persons or entities recommended [the] nominee:
[s]ecurity holder, non-management director, chief executive officer, other
executive officer, third-party search firm, or other specified source.”179
While this disclosure requirement seems tailor-made for the kind of
influence that the government might exercise over a company’s board, there
is a timing problem. The proxy rule requirement to identify the source of a
nominee applies only when a company files and distributes its proxy
statement seeking votes for director candidates that the company’s board has
nominated.180 Thus, a company whose board elects a director to the board
between shareholder meetings will not have to disclose the party
recommending the new director until the director runs for reelection at the
next shareholder meeting, which may be months away.181 It is this timing
problem that created the late disclosures about Liddy and one other director
at AIG: they joined the board months before the company was required, by
the proxy statement rule, to describe the government role in their
ascension.182
E. The Holes in Whole
The government’s general exemption from Exchange Act compliance
categorically excuses it from any reporting under that Act when the

178. 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c) (2012) (Item 407).
179. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 (2012) (emphasis added) (Item 7(d), cross-referencing Reg. S-K
Item 407(c)(2) at 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2), which includes the quoted requirement in subpart (vii)).
180. The proxy disclosure schedule in 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101 only applies to a company when
the company seeks shareholder proxies. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-2, 14a-3(a)(1). And Item 7(d) of that
disclosure schedule—by its terms—only applies if, at the shareholder meeting for which proxies are
sought, “action is to be taken with respect to the election of directors.”
181. This rule does not apply to nominees who are “directors standing for reelection.” Id. Read
literally, therefore, the rule appears to exempt directors who are elected to a board, by the board,
between shareholder meetings because, by the time they are listed on the company’s proxy card,
those directors are “standing for reelection.” The SEC has, however, foreclosed that reading. SEC,
Item 407 of Regulation S-K—Corporate Governance at Question 3.02 (Mar. 13, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/execcomp407interp.htm.
182. Liddy joined the board in September 2008 and Dammerman in November 2008. See supra
note 41. AIG filed its preliminary proxy statement for the next director election on May 21, 2009.
See supra note 53.
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government actively seeks to change the board at a public company.183 The
loophole remains open even when the government holds a majority voting
interest in a company, as it did in AIG.184 With the government not required
to report its influence on board changes, the only other party in a position to
do so is the company whose board the government affects. Yet gaps in the
statutes and rules permit a company to avoid or delay disclosure as well.185
None of the existing disclosure rules requires that the company disclose
government pressure to remove board members, unless that pressure results
in a disagreement between a departing director and the company, or the
government applies pressure through an “enforceable” agreement.186
Existing rules require company disclosure of government pressure to add an
individual to a board, but only if the government “recommends” that
individual to the company’s board, or the government applies pressure
through an “enforceable” agreement with the company, or the government
has an “arrangement or understanding” with the newly appointed director.187
A banking company subject to an “informal” enforcement action by a
federal regulator can avoid disclosing that the agency is pressing for a board
change through a “material definitive agreement” because the “informal”
And, even when the government
action is not “enforceable.”188
“recommends” a candidate who joins a board between shareholder meetings,
the government may have no arrangement or understanding with the new
director, so that the company need not disclose the government’s role until
the director runs for election at the next annual shareholder meeting.189
In sum, the most likely applicable disclosure rules have holes through
which timely and complete disclosure of government efforts to change a
public company’s board can slip. And slip it did in the AIG case, even more
so in that of BofA.190
IV. WHY WE SHOULD PLUG THE HOLES
Thus far, the discussion has examined government influence on the
composition of boards at two public companies, demonstrated that securities

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra Part III.A–D.
See supra Part III.C.1–2.
See supra Part III.C.1–2, D.
See supra Part III.C.2.
See supra Part III.C.1, D.
See supra Parts II.A.4, and II.B.5.
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filings did not fully disclose that influence, and provided the technical
reasons for the disclosure gap.191 The analysis now turns to why we should
close the gap. This section focuses, first, on the central place that the board
occupies in a corporation192 and, second, on the express recognition in
existing securities regulations that disclosure of board changes—and
disclosure of who influences those changes—is important.193 The section
then argues, third, that all major theories of the corporation attribute
importance to the composition of a board and, expressly or implicitly,
attribute significance to the identity of those who control board
composition.194 Fourth and finally, this section addresses two strains of
academic thought that go the other way—one arguing that, despite their lofty
formal status, boards wield little practical influence, and the other arguing
that shareholder control of board composition is an illusion.195 While those
scholarly contentions imply that the disclosure deficiencies identified in this
Article need not concern us, regulatory actions addressing these very
matters, as well as increased shareholder activism, demonstrate that the
disclosure holes are important after all.
A. The Board’s Formal and Practical Control of a Company
The law grants sweeping power to a corporation’s board. State
corporate law—represented for the purposes of this Article by the Delaware
General Corporation Law196—provides that “[t]he business and affairs of
every corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board
of directors.”197 The board serves as a kind of benign oligarchy looking out
for the company’s long-term health and, in so doing, enjoys the authority to
act even in ways that harm shareholders in the short term. For example,
although shareholders must vote to approve a merger, a merger agreement
only goes to a shareholder vote after the board has approved the deal.198
Accordingly, a board can “just say ‘no’” to a premium offer that would
reward shareholders with a certain and immediate gain on the basis that the
merger interferes with a long-term strategy that the board has adopted in the

191. See supra Parts II–III.
192. See infra Part IV.A.
193. See infra Part IV.B.
194. See infra Part IV.C.
195. See infra Part IV.D.
196. Delaware supplies the prevalent law. Division of Corporations, STATE OF DELAWARE,
http://corp.delaware.gov/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2013) (“more than 50% of all U.S. publicly-traded
companies and 63% of the Fortune 500” are incorporated in Delaware). The laws of other states
vary on some of the matters discussed below.
197. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011).
198. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2011).
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hope to generate projected (but uncertain) out-year gains.199 When a board
says “no,” the shareholders never vote on the premium offer at all, and,
absent a tender offer, do not receive the immediate premium.200 Even when
a potential acquirer makes a tender offer, a board can defeat the offer by
adopting a “poison pill” and declining to redeem the pill during a takeover
battle.201 The board’s power to thereby control shareholder access to
bountiful buyouts has important effects on investors. Shareholders in
companies whose boards successfully resist acquisitions reap, on average,
lower returns than shareholders in companies that are acquired.202
Just as the board plays a central role in takeovers, it plays a key role in

199.

See Paramount Commc’n, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150, 1154 (Del. 1989).
[A]bsent a limited set of circumstances as defined under Revlon [as when a board has put
a company up for immediate sale], a board of directors, while always required to act in an
informed manner, is not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short
term, even in the context of a takeover.
....

The fiduciary duty to manage a corporate enterprise includes the selection of a time frame
for achievement of corporate goals. That duty may not be delegated to the stockholders.
[Smith v.] Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d [858,] 873 [(Del. 1985)]. Directors are not obliged to
abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit
unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corporate strategy.
Id. (internal citations omitted). While a board’s vote to “just say ‘no’” to a premium offer is limited
by fiduciary duties, courts review such decisions for breach of the duty of care, applying the business
judgment rule. Provided that the directors’ procedure for reaching their conclusion (including the
manner in which they inform themselves of facts) does not constitute gross negligence and the
directors act in good faith, the directors commit no duty of care violation. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at
873; see also Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 706 (Del. 2009) (elsewhere, overruling Van
Gorkom on an unrelated point).
200. See generally Chrysogelos v. London, 18 Del. J. Corp. L. 237, 250 (Del. Ch. Mar. 25, 1992)
(“[O]ur courts have recognized that shareholders have no contractual right to receive takeover bids,
and that the shareholders’ ability to gain premiums through takeover activity ‘is subject to the good
faith business judgment of the board of directors in structuring defensive tactics.’”) (quoting Moran
v. Household Intern., Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1079 (Del. Ch. Jan. 29, 1985), disapproved of on another
point, Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1035 (Del. 2004)).
201. See Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1351, 1357 (Del. 1985) (holding poison
pill plan validly adopted); EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL
CORPORATION LAW §141.2.6.6 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter FOLK ON DGCL] (summarizing cases
denying orders for redemptions of pills).
202. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887, 925, 934 Table 3 (2002) (examining ninetytwo hostile takeover bids initiated and resolved between January 1996 and December 2000 and
finding an 18.2% average nine-month shareholder return at companies that remained independent
compared to a 54.5% return for the companies that were sold, and an average 25.0% thirty-month
return for companies that remained independent compared to a 79.7% return at companies that were
sold).
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declaring dividends.203 Absent extraordinary circumstances, shareholders
cannot compel the board to pay out the company’s cash to them.204 The
board can pay no dividends if, in its judgment, husbanding the company’s
cash for other purposes is better use of the money than paying it to
shareholders205—as, for example, when the board decides to use the cash to
finance efforts that may prove profitable in years to come, instead of making
dividend payments to stockholders right now.
The board also sets a public corporation’s business strategy, writ
large.206 The board can force implementation of the strategy it selects
because the board hires and fires top management.207 And the board,
through its compensation committee, sets the pay for top officers, including
the objectives that the officer must meet to receive incentive payments—
thus controlling company strategy, writ small.208
Boards not only possess power; they exercise it. For example, boards
exercise their power to replace top executives. One study of large company
CEOs reports that, of 981 CEOs leaving between 1971 and 2006, seventeen
percent departed because of pressure from the board.209 One scholar’s
examination of firms suffering during the credit crisis purports to find that
boards acted efficiently to remove top executives at companies that
experienced financial distress during the 2008 market decline.210 Anecdotal

203. See Gabelli & Co. v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 479 A.2d 276, 280 (Del. 1984).
204. Id.
205. FOLK ON DGCL, supra note 201, § 170.7 (the “declaration of a dividend is ordinarily the
sole prerogative of the board of directors”; “the mere fact that assets exist from which a dividend
may be declared is insufficient” to justify a court order that a dividend be declared).
206. CORPORATE LAWS COMM., ABA BUS. LAW SECTION, CORPORATE DIRECTOR’S GUIDEBOOK
13 (6th ed. 2011) (stating that a board’s “principal responsibilities” include “provid[ing] general
direction and guidance with respect to the corporation’s strategy”).
207. Bylaws govern appointment of officers. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(e) (2011). Bylaws
routinely give the board the power to appoint the CEO. See, e.g., AIG Bylaws, supra note 40, at Art.
IV § 4.1 (“As soon as practicable after the annual meeting of stockholders in each year, the Board of
Directors shall elect a Chief Executive Officer . . . .”); BofA Bylaws, supra note 86, at Art. VI § 2
(“The officers of the Corporation shall be elected by the Board of Directors or by a committee or an
officer authorized by the Board of Directors or a committee to elect one or more officers; provided,
however, that no officer may be authorized to elect . . . the Chief Executive Officer . . . .”).
Bylaws can also govern the removal of the CEO. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(b); see e.g.,
AIG Bylaws, supra note 40, at Art. IV § 4.2 (“The Board may remove any officer with or without
cause at any time.”); BofA Bylaws, supra note 86, at Art. VI § 4 (“The Board of Directors, by the
affirmative vote of a majority of its members, may remove . . . the Chief Executive Officer . . .
whenever in its judgment the best interest of the Corporation would be served thereby.”).
208. NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 31, § 303A.05(b)(i)(A).
209. Lucian A. Taylor, Why Are CEOs Rarely Fired? Evidence from Structural Estimation, 65 J.
OF FIN. 2051, 2065, Table II (2010).
210. Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock Market
Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 BUS. LAW. 1, 37–40 (2009) (“Factiva searches for the
thirty-seven companies removed from the S&P 500 during 2008 reveal publicized CEO turnover in
nine firms, publicized senior (but non-CEO) executive turnover in eight, and turnover of both sorts
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evidence also supports the notion that a key board role is to fire the CEO
when it is in the interest of the company to do so. The Hewlett-Packard
board, which forced out Carly Fiorina,211 and the Merrill Lynch board, which
forced out Stanley O’Neal,212 provide well-known examples.
Moreover, studies show that the composition of a board, and its
committees, affects a company in important ways. Boards with greater
accounting expertise—particularly boards that place directors with
accounting expertise on their audit committees—provide better financial
reporting.213 The speed with which a board discharges a CEO when a
company underperforms its peers increases with director independence from
management and increases with director ownership of stock.214 At least one
study finds that CEO pay is lower, and firm value is higher, when a board
includes a director who is independent of management and who either
controls at least one percent of the equity voting power or owns at least one
percent of the equity cash flow rights—with those correlations stronger if the

in four companies . . . . The . . . turnover . . . was not randomly distributed. Instead, all but two of
the companies involved were financials and the action focused almost exclusively on ‘at risk’
companies.
This is what would have been anticipated with well-functioning corporate
governance . . . .”).
211. See Gary Rivlin, Hewlett’s Board Forces Chief Out After Rocky Stay, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 10,
2005, at A1; Pui-Wing Tam, Fallen Star: H-P’s Board Ousts Fiorina as CEO, WALL ST. J., Feb. 10,
2005, at A1 (detailing board-CEO discussions over several months that culminated in the firing).
212. Graham Bowley & Jenny Anderson, Where Did the Buck Stop at Merrill?, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2007, § 3 (Money and Business), at 1 (“Merrill’s board acted decisively immediately after
the firm’s huge losses were disclosed and after it was further revealed that Mr. O’Neal had made an
unauthorized merger approach to Wachovia. Within days, the board showed him the door . . . .”).
While “[h]is ouster was being described as a retirement,” Landon Thomas, Jr., Merrill Chooses
Insider To Lead Search for Chief, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2007, at C1, Mr. O’Neal testified later that
“the Board asked me to retire shortly after we announced a large sub-prime related write-down in
late 2007,” CEO Pay and the Mortgage Crisis: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and
Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 184 (2008) (statement of E. Stanley O’Neal, former CEO of Merrill
Lynch).
213. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rediscovering Board Expertise: Legal Implications of the
Empirical Literature, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 465, 480 (2008) (summarizing “[e]xtensive research”
showing “the correlation between various conceptions of audit committee expertise and related
proxies for financial reporting quality (sometimes thought of as audit committee effectiveness)”).
214. See Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance, 14 J.
CORP. FIN. 257, 261 Table 269, Table 7, 270 (2008) (using data for percentage of unaffiliated and
independent directors from 1996 to 2003 (9317 observations) and data for median dollar value of
director stock ownership from 1998 to 2002 (6126 observations); finding that, considered together,
“the dollar value of the median director’s stock ownership and the percentage of directors who are
independent[]increase[] the probability of disciplinary turnover for poorly performing firms,” with
poor performance measured by two years’ stock returns after controlling for industry returns, among
other variables).
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large shareholder sits on the board’s compensation committee.215
In sum, because the law puts the board at the top of the corporation
control pyramid, the party controlling board composition can dominate a
company. That domination affects everything from mergers and the quality
of financial reports to the value of the company. If the government controls
the composition of a corporation’s board, the government may thus affect
the enterprise profoundly.
B. The Recognition that Influence on Board Composition Is Material
Federal securities laws regulate the revelation of “material”
information.216 Information about a company is material if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider the
information important in deciding whether to buy or sell the securities of the
company, taking into account the total mix of information available and
relevant to that decision.217
Existing disclosure rules reflect a judgment that changes in board
composition—and the reasons for and identification of the parties behind
such changes—are material and therefore should be disclosed. When the
Commission last adopted major changes in Form 8-K, the SEC stated that
the facts companies must reveal in 8-K filings are “unquestionably or
presumptively material” and therefore “must be disclosed currently.”218 As
Part III.C.1 shows, those facts include director arrivals and departures,
together with agreements by which directors join a board and disagreements
causing directors to leave.219 The existing rules also recognize the
importance of disclosing who is trying to add or remove directors, with
Schedule 13D requiring disclosure by shareholders with more than five

215. Anup Agrawal & Tareque Nasser, Blockholders on Boards and CEO Compensation,
Turnover and Firm Valuation 7, n.8, 8, 26 (Sept. 2012) (unpublished draft) (on file with author and
available at http://bama.ua.edu/~aagrawal/IDB-CEO.pdf) (defining an IDB as “an independent
director who is (or represents) a blockholder” with the voting power or financial interest set out in
the text; using a sample of 11,547 firm-years over 1998–2006). The study found, after controlling
for other variables, that an individual or hedge fund IDB on a board is associated with lower CEO
compensation, id. at 16–17, an IDB presence correlates to a much higher probability of CEO
turnover in the face of poor market-adjusted stock return, id. at 21–22, and IDB directors lead to a
higher industry-adjusted Tobin’s q, id. at 22–23, a measure that the authors used for firm valuation,
id. at 22. The researchers concluded that “these effects are substantial and are generally larger when
an IDB serves on the board’s compensation committee.” Id. at 26.
216. 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION §3.4[2] (6th ed. 2009) (“The
basic dividing line between what has to be disclosed and what information may be withheld is
determined by the concept of materiality . . . .”).
217. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988).
218. Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, 69 Fed.
Reg. 15,594, 15,595 (Mar. 25, 2004).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 148–50, 154–55.
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percent of a class of stock if the shareholders harbor “any plans” to change
board composition.220 Such disclosures aim “to provide investors with
notice of a possible change in management or the direction of a business as
it ‘may affect their judgment as to whether the stock should be sold,
bought[,] or held’”221—the very definition of materiality. And existing rules
acknowledge the importance of disclosing who “recommended” director
candidates that the company nominates, with the proxy rules mandating
identification of such recommenders.222 Indeed, when the SEC imposed the
rule requiring disclosure of parties recommending candidates for the board,
it rejected the argument that that information was not material.223
Given the acknowledged importance of revealing director changes and
who orchestrates those changes, it is especially strange that government
influence should be shielded from disclosure. The goal of a private market
actor that is engineering a board change is almost certainly to change the
company so that the return on the stock it holds will increase. But the
government’s goal in controlling a board might be quite different. For
example, the government might be using corporate regime change to reduce
the risk that a bank poses to the financial system, without regard to whether
doing so will increase or even decrease expected returns to shareholders.
Since the government could have such a vastly different purpose than a more
traditional market actor, disclosure of the government’s role is especially
important.
C. The Importance of Board Composition in Corporate Theory
Not only is government influence over board composition practically
important to investors, and not only is that influence material by security law
standards, but government influence also implicates corporate theory. The

220. See supra text accompanying notes 128–29.
221. Independence Fed. Sav. Bank v. Bender, 332 F. Supp. 2d 203, 213 (D.D.C. 2004) (citing
Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y.1982)). The purchaser of a morethan-five-percent block must reveal plans to change the board “regardless of whether one of the
purposes of the purchase is to acquire control of the issuer.” Filing and Disclosure Requirements
Relating to Beneficial Ownership, 43 Fed. Reg. 18,484, 18,493 (Apr. 28, 1978)).
222. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
223. Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications Between
Security Holders and Boards of Directors, 68 Fed. Reg. 69,204, 69,208 (Dec. 11, 2003) (noting that
the proposed rule “to identify the source of all director nominees” had drawn “extensive comment,”
including the argument that it should not be imposed because “naming the specific source . . . would
be immaterial,” but including the new requirement because the SEC “continue[d] to believe that
information regarding the sources of company nominees is important for security holders.”).
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three principal theories of the corporation all attribute importance to the
board, and to the identity of those who control board membership. This
section summarizes the three theories in skeletal form, without the
intricacies added by a legion of scholars.224 The purpose is not to evaluate
the theories, much less to select one that is “best.” This section aims only to
show that influence by the government on board composition is a matter of
extreme importance under each and every one of these theoretical
constructs.
1. Shareholder Primacy Theory
“Shareholder primacy” can describe corporations or serve as a
normative rule for corporate operations.
As a descriptive theory,
shareholder primacy posits that the shareholders “own” the business and
elect directors who, in a sense, serve as the shareholders’ agents in running
the corporation by, among other things, appointing the officers.225 The line
of action starts with shareholders, then proceeds to the directors, and then to
the officers.
That description suggests the normative conclusion that a corporation
should be run for the benefit of the shareholders, because they own it.226
Shareholder primacy as a normative theory, however, is not tied exclusively
to shareholder primacy as a descriptive device.227 Even some scholars who
do not find it useful to describe corporate action as flowing from the owners
(shareholders) to their agents (directors) to the employees (officers) still
conclude that shareholder wealth maximization is the appropriate corporate
goal for economic reasons.228 They argue, for example, that maximizing
shareholder return minimizes the cost of capital and deters shirking by

224. A more elaborate taxonomy would subdivide the categories in the text and find a larger
number of analytically distinct theories. Moreover, the theories to some extent blend into one
another. For my very limited purposes, however, the three-theory division is sufficient.
225. See, e.g., William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 264–65 (1992). The directors are not the shareholders’ agents in a legal
sense for a variety of reasons, including that the shareholders cannot control the directors’ actions
after the shareholders elect the board. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(2) (2006).
However, the shareholder primacy model—as a descriptive construct—sees the directors as the
shareholders’ economic agents.
226. Allen, supra note 225, at 265 (under this analysis, “[t]he corporation’s purpose is to advance
the purposes of these owners (predominantly to increase their wealth), and the function of directors,
as agents of the owners, is faithfully to advance the financial interests of the owners”).
227. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 53 (2008) (“Although they are often used interchangeably, the terms ‘shareholder
primacy’ and ‘shareholder wealth maximization’ in fact express distinct concepts. The shareholder
wealth maximization norm is a basic feature of U.S. corporate governance.”).
228. Id. at 65–75.
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executives and workers.229
Corporate law reflects shareholder primacy theory to a significant
degree. Delaware law230 requires that shareholders elect directors.231
Delaware also provides that shareholders can remove directors, even
without cause.232 And Delaware closely guards the right of the shareholders
to control board membership in these ways. For example, the board itself
cannot remove a director.233 Even a court’s power to do so is limited.234
Absent exceptional circumstances, “[t]he only persons empowered to
remove a director are the corporation’s shareholders.”235 As another
example, Delaware employs a special rule to scrutinize companies that seek
to defeat the shareholder franchise by thwarting a shareholder-led effort to
change the board.236 If actions that in fact frustrate such a shareholder effort
are undertaken “for the primary purpose of impeding the exercise of
stockholder voting power” to elect new directors, those actions only survive
judicial review if the sitting board bears “the heavy burden of demonstrating
a compelling justification.”237
229. Since the shareholders only receive the cash from operations and sale of the company or its
assets after the executives, employees, outside advisors, and creditors are paid, the shareholders are
the ones with the incentive to ensure that all of the other actors function effectively. Id.
230. See supra note 196 (Delaware law predominant among large, publicly traded companies).
231. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2011).
232. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2011) (providing also that, if different classes or series
elect different directors, only a vote of the shareholders who elected a particular director can remove
that director).
233. Nevins v. Bryan, 885 A.2d 233, 251–52 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 884 A.2d 512 (Del. 2005)
(“Section 141(k) of the DGCL states that directors may be removed with or without cause by a
majority of the shares of the company. [B]y negative implication intended by the draftsmen,
directors do not have the authority to remove other directors.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Rohe v. Reliance Training Network, Inc., No. 17992, 2000 WL 1038190, at *11 n.30 (Del.
Ch. July 21, 2000)); FOLK ON DGCL, supra note 201, § 141.5.4.
234. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 225(c) (2011); Shocking Techs., Inc. v. Michael, C.A. No. 7164VCN, 2012 WL 1352431 at *1 & n.5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 10, 2012); Ross Sys. Corp. v. Ross, Civ. A. No.
10378, 1993 WL 49778 at *17–18 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 1993).
235. Id. at *17 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2011)). The stockholders’ power to
remove directors implements the normative principle of shareholder primacy. See Bebchuk,
Shareholder Franchise, supra note 33, at 682 (“[A] viable shareholder power to replace directors . . .
is necessary to provide directors with strong affirmative incentives to focus on shareholder
interests.”).
236. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
237. Id. at 661. While Blasius phrases its test so generally that it could apply to any effort to
thwart shareholder voting, later cases largely limit it to instances in which the interference with
shareholder voting affects director elections—confirming that the exceedingly difficult standard
should be reserved for instances in which the action undermines the fundamental principle that
shareholders control board composition. See Mercier v. Inter-Tel (Del.), Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 808–09
(Del. Ch. 2007); In re The MONY Group, Inc. S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 674 (Del. Ch. 2004).
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Delaware’s solicitude for shareholder power over board composition
derives from the principle that the board rightly exercises power precisely
because the corporation’s owners elect the board. As one opinion puts it,
“[t]he shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the
Delaware accordingly
legitimacy of directorial power rests.”238
“recognize[s] the transcending significance of the franchise to the claims to
legitimacy of our scheme of corporate governance.”239
As a descriptive construct, shareholder primacy relates simply and
directly to government control of the board. If the government owns shares
with controlling voting power, as was true at AIG240—and if the company is
properly described as a corporation—the government should control board
composition. As a normative matter, if the government is a shareholder, the
company should be run for the financial benefit of the government (as well
as the rest of the shareholders).241
But where the government is not a voting shareholder, as was true at
BofA,242 then shareholder primacy theory is unremittingly hostile to
government power over director selection and retention. If the government
can come in from the side and disturb the clear vertical hierarchy running
from the shareholders to their economic agents (the board) and to employees
(the officers), then the description of the corporation as an entity controlled
by the shareholders through election of the board is no longer accurate.
Using shareholder primacy as a descriptive construct, a corporation whose
board composition is determined to a significant degree by the government
without shareholder votes is not a corporation at all.
Normatively, government influence on director selection and
retention—when the government does not exercise that control through its
share ownership—threatens the very legitimacy of the board, which rests on
the directors’ election by owners. Government control threatens, as well, to
turn the ends of the corporation from maximizing shareholder wealth to
some other, politically determined, purpose. That purpose might diminish
the healthy influence that the focus on shareholder return produces on the
efforts of other corporate participants.
2. Stakeholder Theory
Stakeholder theorists argue that shareholders are not “owners” of the
corporation within the ordinary meaning of that word243 and that the
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
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Blasius, 564 A.2d at 659.
Id. at 662.
See supra Part II.A.1.
See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
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directors are not “agents” of the shareholders.244 These theorists describe the
corporation as a social actor that affects and is affected by a variety of
constituencies—not only shareholders, but also employees, suppliers,
customers, the communities in which the corporation does business and, in
the view of some, the earth itself.245
Beyond describing the corporation in this more diffuse way, stakeholder
theory argues normatively that corporations should not seek solely to
increase the wealth of shareholders. Instead, the corporation should decide
its actions after taking into account the effects on all constituencies—each of
which has a moral claim on the corporation that goes beyond contract terms
and beyond regulatory requirements.246 This broader normative focus
derives, to some extent, from the simple notion that a corporation affecting
multiple “constituencies” has the duty to treat each of them well.247 Some
academics further justify a concern for non-shareholder constituencies on an
Some Thoughts on Vice-Chancellor Strine’s Essay, 33 J. CORP. L. 63, 66 (2007) (“The whole point
of the corporate form is to make clear that shareholders are not owners—that their share ownership
gives them no right to claim or exercise control over their pro rata share of the corporation’s assets
or profits.”).
244. Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733,
754–55 (2007) (“Equally misleading is the similar myth that directors are ‘agents’ of shareholder
‘principals.’”).
245. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1491 (1992) (“A classic question in the
theory of corporate law is whether a corporation’s managers should ever exercise their discretion to
further the interests of constituencies other than providers of capital. . . . Corporate social
responsibility [largely derived from stakeholder theory] may include attention to constituencies such
as workers, communities, and consumers, and to goals such as preservation of the environment.”).
246. See, e.g., Michael R. Siebecker, A New Discourse Theory of the Firm After Citizens United,
79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 161, 174–75 (2010) (“With the identity of the corporation organically
shifting to accommodate its enhanced role in shaping markets and communities, ‘[c]orporate internal
governance issues, once considered strictly economic and confined to internal corporate
stakeholders, have been broadened to include . . . the concerns of outside stakeholders beyond the
regulatory authority of the chartering state.’”) (quoting Larry Catá Backer, The Private Law of
Public Law: Public Authorities as Shareholders, Golden Shares, Sovereign Wealth Funds, and the
Public Law Element in Private Choice of Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1801, 1807 (2008)); Julian Velasco,
The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 454 (2006) (“To be a
meaningful concept, [corporate] social responsibility [to stakeholders other than shareholders] must
extend beyond legal requirements—and thus, by definition, cannot be legally enforceable.”).
247. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A
Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767, 814 (2005)
(referring to one school of thought that “emphasizes the benefits of corporate existence derived from
the state” that create “an implicit contract . . . that the corporation will help the state in mitigating
harms that [the corporation] causes even in the absence of legal responsibility”). And other scholars
rest broad corporate moral obligations on the notion that parties affected by a business rely upon it.
See David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies,
in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 9, 10 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995).
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economic basis. One set of scholars, for example, characterizes business
output as “team production,” with the team including participants other than
shareholders and with the corporation able to flourish economically only if it
honors obligations to other team members by taking actions beyond those to
which the company is legally bound.248
Some aspects of current corporate law reflect stakeholder theory.
Delaware decisions allow target boards to consider non-shareholder
“constituencies” when making decisions on takeover proposals, at least
when the target is not simply selling itself to the highest bidder.249 Even
more strikingly, many state corporate statutes—largely in response to hostile
takeovers in the 1980s—contain provisions that expressly permit (and in a
few instances require) boards to consider constituencies other than
shareholders when making business decisions.250
The theory and law embodying stakeholder theory’s normative
component, however, quickly encounters a central problem. With many
different “stakeholders,” the interests of some may conflict with the interests
of others, and, if the corporation really owes moral duties to different
constituencies (or duties which must be faithfully discharged in order to
produce desirable economic results), the business will at times have to make
tough choices between stakeholders.251 For example, a company may have
to determine the extent to which it should forego shareholder returns in order
to keep its employment numbers high and thereby benefit its labor force. As

248. The “team production” theorists see participants in a business enterprise (shareholders,
creditors, employees, management) as making firm-specific investments of labor or capital—
difficult or impossible to retrieve at a value equal to the initial cost—and together creating a product
or service that is hard to conceptually disassemble in order to attribute portions of its value to
different participants. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 249, 276 (1999). These theorists therefore argue that, beyond contract, the
participants enter into a pact to resolve disputes through a designated hierarchy that “can be viewed
as a substitute for explicit contracting . . . .” Id. at 278; see also id. at 319–20. The job of the
hierarchy—with the board sitting at the top—is to serve the team as a whole by “control[ling]
shirking and rent-seeking” by the different members and to “balance team members’ competing
interests in a fashion that keeps everyone happy enough that the productive coalition stays together.”
Id. at 280–81.
249. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (permitting a board, in
analyzing the threat posed by a takeover bid, to consider “the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than
shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally)”).
But see Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986)
(limiting consideration of other constituencies to instances in which “there are rationally related
benefits accruing to the stockholders” and prohibiting such consideration altogether when a board is
auctioning the company).
250. Martin Lipton, Twenty-Five Years After Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom: Old
Battles, New Attacks and the Continuing War, 60 BUS. LAW. 1369, 1371 n.3 (2005).
251. See Millon, supra note 247, at 14 (“In the situations that communitarians are concerned
about, the interests of particular non-shareholder constituencies conflict with those of shareholders,
and there may well be conflicts among the interests of different nonshareholder constituencies as
well.”).
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another example, a company owning a plant that operates legally, but
unfortunately degrades the air quality in the surrounding community, might
have to choose between shutting down that plant (thereby benefiting the
community at the expense of both shareholders and the laborers employed at
the plant) or continuing to operate the plant (thereby imposing
environmental costs on the community while saving the jobs of those who
work at the facility and making more money for the shareholders).
Some central corporate body must aggregate the interests of the
different stakeholders and mediate trade-offs between them.252
Not
surprisingly, stakeholder theorists have selected the board of directors,
occupying the top spot in the corporate hierarchy, to play this key role.253
Clearly, then, if the government controls or influences board composition,
the government can affect the trade-offs between stakeholders, perhaps even
wildly shifting the company’s priorities.
3. Nexus of Contracts Theory
Yet a third theory describes the corporation as a network of contractual
relationships.254 This description posits that the company is “an aggregate of
various inputs acting together to produce goods or services,”255 with “explicit
and implicit contracts establishing rights and obligations among the various
inputs.”256 The contracts define shareholder rights against the board and
board rights against management—rights set out in the articles of
incorporation and the corporate law of the state in which the company is
organized.257 The contracts include, as well, the debt agreements that define

252. See Blair & Stout, supra note 248, at 278.
253. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of
the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 403, 435 (2001) (“Just as directors are free to listen (if not
always to respond) to the shareholders’ wishes, they are free to listen (if not always to respond) to
the wishes of creditors, top executives, and rank and file employees.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Social
Responsibility of Boards of Directors and Stockholders in Charge of Control Transactions: Is There
Any “There” There?, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1174 (2002) (noting the view that “the board acts as
a ‘mediating hierarch’ that balances the respective interests”); see also Allen, supra note 225, at 271
(“Resolving the often conflicting claims of [the] various corporate constituencies calls for judgment,
indeed calls for wisdom, by the board of directors . . . .”).
254. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 227, at 28–30.
255. Id. at 28.
256. Id.
257. See FOLK ON DGCL, supra note 201, § 102.16 (“A certificate of incorporation is a contract
among the stockholders of the corporation” with “[t]he contract rights of the stockholders of the
corporation . . . also subject to the provisions of the Delaware General Corporation Law.”). Even the
law itself is a matter of contract in an important sense. The organizers of a business choose its form
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the rights of those who loan money to the company, and employment
agreements with executives and with the non-management labor force.258
Some individual or group must coordinate all the contracts so that the
That
corporation operates in some reasonably purposeful way.259
coordinator—the “nexus” of the network of contracts—is, by at least one
prominent theorist, the board of directors.260 Indeed, that same theorist,
relying in part on the description of the modern corporation as an
interconnected set of contracts, argues that public companies today display
not shareholder primacy but “director primacy,”261 claiming that “to the
limited extent . . . the corporation is properly understood as a real entity, it is
the board of directors that personifies the corporate entity.”262
While this analysis has not influenced the law as directly as shareholder
primacy and stakeholder theory, the nexus of contracts construct is well
recognized among corporate scholars263 and puts the board at the center of
the web of relationships constituting the company.264 The identity of board
members and those who select directors arguably ranks at the top of all
corporate concerns for anyone who embraces this theory—certainly for
those who conclude that corporations today display “director primacy.”
Thus, this third theory, too, highlights the importance of government
influence over director selection. If the government controls the board, it
controls the nexus of the contracts. Such control could affect any or all of
the principal contracts constituting the corporation and could pull the entire
web of contracts in one direction or another.
(e.g., “as a corporation, trust, partnership, mutual, or cooperative”). FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 2 (1991). They choose the
state in which to incorporate, with that state’s law thereafter governing the “internal affairs” of the
company, including “the powers and obligations of a corporation’s managers vis-à-vis the
corporation and its shareholders, and the rights and duties of the . . . shareholders vis-à-vis the
corporation, its management and the other shareholders . . . .”
FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ,
CORPORATION LAW §§ 1.2, 1.2.1 (2d ed. 2010).
258. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 553 (2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Director Primacy].
259. Id. at 556.
260. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 227, at 33–34 (citations omitted):
[T]he defining characteristic of a corporation is the existence of a central decision maker
vested with the power of fiat—i.e., a central coordinator that is a party to the set of
contracts we call the firm and that has the power to effect adaptive responses to changed
conditions by fiat.
If the corporation has such a nexus, where is it located? The Delaware code, like the
corporate law of every other state, gives us a clear answer: the corporation’s “business
and affairs . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of the board of directors.” Put
simply, the board is the corporate nexus of contracts.
261. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 258, at 550.
262. Id. at 560.
263. See, e.g., ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW
109 (3d ed. 2009).
264. See Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note 258, at 550.

574

01 FISHER SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[Vol. 40: 533, 2013]

4/2/13 3:07 PM

Investors Should Know
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

D. A Response to Critics
As the previous sections show, government control over board
membership is important from a number of different perspectives. Two
strains of academic thought, however, argue against any urgency in bringing
government influence on public company board membership out of the
darkness and into the light.265
The first concludes that boards—despite their legal authority and their
effect on some important business matters—have little impact on most
companies’ business most of the time.266 This view suggests that the identity
of directors—and those who select the directors—is of so little importance
that the disclosure of currently cloaked government efforts to change boards
is not worth the cost such disclosure would impose.267 The second strain
argues that shareholders inevitably have scant influence on board
membership.268 This school of thought implies that “protecting” the
shareholder franchise by revealing how government influence supplants it,
or simply revealing government influence because it deviates from the norm
of shareholder control over director selection, protects a mere chimera or
reveals a departure from a formal but empty protocol.269 Neither school of
thought should deflect us from the reform this Article advocates.
1. The Argument That Most Boards Are Mostly Unimportant
Some scholars contend that, although state law nominally places the
board of directors at the top of the corporation, and although the financial
press has published the extraordinary actions of a handful of boards, the
boards of most publicly traded corporations are overwhelmingly passive,
and, hence, unimportant. Board passivity, these academics posit, derives
from a host of factors. Boards fail to effectively monitor executive
performance in part because the boards themselves selected the executives,
and boards fail to skeptically evaluate the results of corporate strategy
because the boards in one way or another approved those strategies before or
while the executives implemented them.270 Ironically, this debility increases

265. See infra Parts IV.D.1–2.
266. See infra Part IV.D.1.
267. Id.
268. See infra Part IV.D.2.
269. Id.
270. See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES
BROKEN 70 (2008).
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as boards become more deeply involved in strategy and executive hiring.271
The greater their involvement, the greater the directors’ personal
commitment to any strategic or hiring decision and, therefore, the more
difficulty the board experiences in critically evaluating that decision.272
In addition to this inherent weakness, boards are often “captured” by top
executives because top executives are inevitably involved in the selection of
new directors and the recommendation for re-nomination of sitting board
members, and the directors, well knowing this to be the case, are reluctant to
criticize their patrons.273 Further, management’s control over the agenda of
board meetings, and over the information that the board considers as it
attends to that agenda, weakens the board as a source of independent
power.274 The need for speedy board decisions on such matters as mergers
and acquisitions—after executives dump data on directors—aggravates this
initiative/information disparity.275 So do social norms of collegiality, which
discourage aggressive questions and frank criticism by board members of
management plans and results.276 And, of course, those board members who
are not officers are part-time participants in the corporation, inherently at a
disadvantage as compared with management in influencing company action,
because management works at the company full time.277
271. See id. at 63 (“Boards cannot be expected to be more objective in their evaluations of senior
management at the same time that they are being required to become increasingly involved with
senior management in the decisions about strategy . . . .”).
272. See id.
273. Id. at 93–95.
274. See MACEY, supra note 270, at 83 (“Generally speaking, management’s control of the flow
of information to the board . . . creates a dynamic in which management is able to capture its
board . . . by controlling the nature of the information available to directors when making
decisions.”). “Boards . . . lack both the inclination and the capacity to generate information for
themselves through a process that is independent of management.” Id. at 94. “The asymmetry of
information . . . [between management and a board] has long been recognized as an impediment to
the ability of boards . . . to monitor management effectively.” Id. at 96.
275. See id. at 60–61 (“Directors who challenge management’s recommendations or who simply
demand more information risk being . . . accused of impeding the company’s ability to respond to
new opportunities efficiently.”).
276. Id. at 61–62.
[D]irectors are supposed to be ‘team players’ who ‘get along’ with senior executives and
their fellow directors, and perform their duties in an atmosphere of comfortable
collegiality.
....
Where a CEO makes a proposal to a group of board members, the first board member to
raise questions or to disagree with management bears the greatest risk of being branded
uncooperative or non-collegial. With this in mind . . . he has an incentive to remain
quiet . . . .
Id.
277. George W. Dent, Jr., Academics in Wonderland: The Team Production and Director Primacy
Models of Corporate Governance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1213, 1242 (2008) (“Most boards meet about
once a month, too little time to match the managers’ knowledge about the firm.”); Oliver E.
Williamson, Corporate Boards of Directors: In Principle and in Practice, 24 J.L. ECON. & ORG.

576

01 FISHER SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[Vol. 40: 533, 2013]

4/2/13 3:07 PM

Investors Should Know
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

If all of these considerations mean that boards are fundamentally
unimportant—as a matter of fact rather than theory and corporate statutes—
then the identity of those who influence the composition of boards is also of
little moment. In that case, there is no pressing need to override whatever
considerations counsel against disclosure of government influence on the
selection and retention of directors.
One powerful answer is that society has made a very determined effort
in the last two decades to address the problems just identified in order to
increase the power of boards, particularly in relation to top management. In
1999, all three major domestic trading platforms adopted rules effectively
requiring public company boards to have audit committees and requiring
that the audit committees—rather than management—possess ultimate
authority over the hiring, evaluation, and replacement of the outside
auditor.278 After the Enron and WorldCom debacles, Congress, through the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, put this requirement into law.279
The scandals also prompted the exchanges, particularly the New York
Stock Exchange, to radically revise listing standards to invigorate boards of
directors in other ways.280 Today, those listing standards require that a
majority of directors serving on each public company board be
“independent,”281 precisely so that the board can “exercise independent
judgment in carrying out [its] responsibilities.”282
To increase the
probability that this majority will vigorously monitor management and
substantively contribute to corporate actions, the listing standards—in
247, 254 (2008).
278. Order Approving Proposed Change in NASDAQ Audit Committee Requirements, 64 Fed.
Reg. 71,523, 71,524–25 (Dec. 14, 1999); Order Approving Proposed Change in American Stock
Exchange Audit Committee Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. 71,518, 71,519 (Dec. 14, 1999); Order
Approving Proposed Change in New York Stock Exchange Audit Committee Requirements, 64 Fed.
Reg. 71,529, 71,529–30 (Dec. 14, 1999).
279. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). The new law required
the SEC to issue regulations requiring the exchanges to decline to list securities unless an issuer’s
audit committee is “directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the
work of [the auditor] . . . (including resolution of disagreements between management and the
auditor regarding financial reporting)” and unless the auditor reports “directly to the audit
committee.” Id. § 301; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1(m)(1)(A), 78j-1(m)(2) (2006). See the resulting
regulation, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10A-3(a)(1), 240.10A-3(b)(2) (2012), and the listing standards
requiring compliance with the regulation, NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 31, §
303A.06;
NASDAQ,
INC.,
STOCK
MARKET
RULE
5605(c)(3),
available
at
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/.
280. See generally Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes Relating to Corporate Governance
at NYSE and NASDAQ Listed Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 4, 2003).
281. NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 31, § 303A.01.
282. Id. § 303A.01 cmt.
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addition to imposing a general test for independence—exclude from
“independent” directors those who have specified relationships that might
cause them to unduly favor management.283 For example, a director is not
independent if he or she receives “more than $120,000 in direct
compensation from the . . . company” “during any twelve-month period”—
compensation that management could control and use to influence the
director’s action in the boardroom.284 In order to “empower nonmanagement directors to serve as a more effective check” on executives, the
NYSE listing standards also mandate that “the non-management directors of
each listed company meet at regularly scheduled executive sessions,”
without company officers present.285
In a further effort to increase independent decision making by directors,
the NYSE requires that each listed company’s board have, in addition to an
audit committee, both a nominating/corporate governance committee and a
compensation committee.286 All of the directors serving on these three key
committees must satisfy the new “independence” definition.287 And the
NYSE standards include lists of specific tasks that these three committees
must undertake in order to ensure that they actually perform their work. 288
The independent directors on the nominating committee, for example,
are charged with “identify[ing] individuals qualified to become board
members, consistent with criteria approved by the board, and . . . select[ing],
or . . . recommend[ing] that the board select, the director nominees for the
next annual meeting of shareholders.”289 At least formally, this takes
director selection out of management’s hands and thereby removes the
influence that the top executive can exercise over directors by controlling
their tenure on the board. To ensure that the nominating committee can
control the search for director candidates, the commentary to the NYSE
listing standards states that “the charter [for each such committee] should
give [that] committee sole authority to retain and terminate any search firm
to be used to identify director candidates, including sole authority to approve
the search firm’s fees and other retention terms.”290
Similarly, by federal law, the listing standards now require express
283. Id. § 303A.02.
284. Id. § 303A.02(b)(ii).
285. Id. § 303A.03.
286. Id. §§ 303A.04, 303A.05, 303A.06.
287. Id. §§ 303A.04(a), 303A.05, 303A.07(a).
288. The standards impose the committees’ duties by requiring that each committee have a
written charter addressing specific duties and responsibilities that the standards lay out. For
example, the standards set out eight specific duties for the audit committee. Id. § 303A.07(b)(iii);
see also id. § 303A.04(b)(i) (tasks for the nominating/corporate governance committee); id. §
303A.05(b)(i) (tasks for the compensation committee).
289. Id. § 303A.04(b)(i).
290. Id. § 303A.04 cmt.
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authority for each audit committee “to engage independent counsel and other
advisors, as it determines necessary to carry out its duties” and require each
public company to pay for any advisor that the audit committee hires.291 The
recent Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act requires that compensation
committees have similar power to hire advisors.292
All of these laws, regulations, and listing standards reflect society’s
determination that boards should—and can—serve as an independent force
at the top of the corporate hierarchy. Instead of giving up on boards as have
some academics, society has by these reforms doubled down on directors.
This is, accordingly, not the time to conclude that boards are so unimportant
that the general thrust of federal securities law—disclosure—should be
ignored when the government actively attempts to control board
membership.
2. The Argument that Shareholder Election of Boards Accomplishes
Naught
As set out above, prevalent state law prescribes that the shareholders
elect and remove directors.293 The notion that we need disclosure when
government influence on board composition displaces shareholder control
over board membership implies that shareholder control over director
selection and retention is “ordinary,” or “better,” or “more legitimate,” in
some sense, than government control.294 That implication, in turn, rests on a
notion that shareholders exercise their franchise to elect boards in a
meaningful way.
For years, however, academics have argued that the shareholders of
widely held public corporations do not care about who the directors are and
that, even if the shareholders care in some abstract sense, they do not, in
practice, evaluate director candidates carefully. By this view, shareholders
are “rationally apathetic” in part due to collective-action problems; it simply
does not pay for one shareholder, holding a sliver percentage of total shares,
to spend the resources to change a board,295 or even in many instances to

291. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-1(m)(5), 78j-1(m)(6) (2006); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10A-3(b)(4), 240.10A3(b)(5)(ii) (2012).
292. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010 & Supp. V 2011), § 952 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j-3(c)–(e) (2006 &
Supp. V 2011)) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank].
293. See supra notes 231–35 and accompanying text.
294. See supra Part IV.C.1.
295. Consider an investor who holds one million shares of a company with one billion shares
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gather information to decide how to vote in director elections.296 Rational
apathy affects even institutional investors, such as mutual funds, since they
often diversify their holdings among many different portfolio companies,
owning only a small proportion of the stock issued by any one of them.297
Even if shareholders were sufficiently motivated to seek information
about director candidates, shareholders in the main (so the argument goes)
simply can never obtain the facts they need to make intelligent choices.298
And if shareholders—one by one—could somehow get hold of and analyze
relevant information, they would risk securities law violations—absent
expensive compliance with complicated securities rules—if they ran their
own director candidates and solicited proxies for that dissident slate.299
To top it off, most director elections are uncontested,300 with only the
candidates nominated by the sitting board running,301 so that the shareholders
do not really have a choice anyway. And plurality voting—the default
voting protocol under state statutes302—ensures that in uncontested elections
a director candidate receiving even one vote in his or her favor will win a
seat on the board, even if all the other votes are “withheld” in protest.303

outstanding. Suppose that investor could, by spending $1,000,000, elect a new board and that the
new board’s actions would raise the stock price by seventy-five cents a share. Shareholders overall
would enjoy a huge gain—$750,000,000. But the investor who went to the trouble of organizing
and funding the campaign for board change would see an increase of only $750,000 in his
shareholdings, thereby suffering a net $250,000 loss on the effort. See Dent, supra note 277, at
1253.
296. MACEY, supra note 270, at 203.
297. Id. at 199–200.
298. A sophisticated version of this argument contends that companies will never disclose all
pertinent information, and therefore shareholders will never have all such information. Therefore, as
ill-informed shareholders acquire power at the expense of better-informed management, the
probability that a company will be operated in a way that optimizes its fundamental value—as
opposed to its stock price—declines. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case
Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 696–703 (2010).
299. If “two or more [shareholders] agree to act together for the purpose of . . . voting . . . equity
securities of an issuer, the group formed thereby shall be deemed to have acquired beneficial
ownership . . . of all equity securities of that issuer beneficially owned by any such persons.” 17
C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(1) (2012). Such a group collectively owning more than ten percent of a class
of equity securities is subject to the reporting requirements in section 16(a) of the Exchange Act. 15
U.S.C. § 78p(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011); 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-1(a)(1) (2012). Such a group
purchasing more than five percent of such a class of securities is subject to the reporting
requirements in section 13(d). See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-5(b)(1). If such
a group “solicits” proxies for voting in director elections, then, with some exceptions, that group
must comply with the proxy solicitation law and regulations. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2006 & Supp. V
2011); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1–240.14a-15 (2012).
300. See Bebchuk, Shareholder Franchise, supra note 33, at 682–83 (finding only about thirty
contested elections per year during 1996 through 2005).
301. See, e.g., NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 31, § 303A.04.
302. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2011).
303. William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of Directors,
40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 466–67 (2007); Vincent Falcone, Note, Majority Voting in Director
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Vast changes—both in the investing industry and, very determinedly, in
the rules and regulations that govern that industry—have attacked virtually
all these problems over the last several decades. On the industry side,
activist hedge funds have acquired stockholdings in a fair number of
publicly traded companies.304 Those funds seek to change the companies’
businesses—in many cases by threatening a proxy fight for board seats and
in some cases by carrying out that threat.305 The hedge funds overcome the
collective-action problem in part simply by owning a sufficient stake to
make their efforts worthwhile to them, and, in part, by a “wolf pack”
effect—with one activist hedge fund leading the attack and other such funds
then buying stock in the attacked public company and supporting the
initiating aggressor.306 And, once an activist hedge fund launches an attack
on a management and an incumbent board, traditional institutional investors
such as mutual funds sometimes join the fight.307 The companies that the
funds assault generally improve their performance.308 All of this works
because the shareholders are employing, or threatening to employ, their
franchise.
Institutional investors’ reliance on professional proxy advisors, who
gather information on director candidates and other matters on which
shareholders vote, also reduces collective-action problems by effectively
spreading the cost of acquiring information among the proxy advisor’s many
clients.309 Those advisors reduce costs still more by shouldering the

Elections: A Simple, Direct, and Swift Solution?, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 844 (2007).
304. See generally William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 Geo. L.J.
1375 (2007).
305. See id. at 1401–05, Table IV (finding 130 domestic companies attacked by hedge fund
between January 1, 2002 and June 30, 2006, at 1385, and describing typical hedge fund tactics,
including 60 cases in which the hedge fund initiated a proxy contest); see also Marcel Kahan &
Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987, 998–1001 (2010).
306. Bratton, supra note 304, at 1403.
307. Kahan & Rock, supra note 305, at 1003–05.
308. Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63
J. FIN. 1729, 1730–31, 1739 (2008) (examining hedge fund activism against 882 target companies
from the beginning of 2001 through the end of 2006; finding “large positive average abnormal
[target company stock price] returns, in the range of 7% to 8%, during the (–20,+20) announcement
window,” with “the positive returns at announcement . . . not reversed over time, as there is no
evidence of a negative abnormal drift during the 1-year period subsequent to the announcement” and
“[t]he positive market reaction . . . also consistent with ex post evidence of overall improved
performance at target firms”).
309. Kahan & Rock, supra note 305, at 1005–07.
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mechanical burden of casting institutional investors’ votes in corporate
elections.310
To address the issues created by plurality voting, shareholder advocates,
including institutional investors, have urged boards to adopt “majority
voting” rules.311 Those rules prevent seating a director who, when running
unopposed, fails to receive “for” votes from a majority of shares cast on his
or her candidacy.312 Beginning in earnest in 2004 with about a dozen
shareholder proposals for such voting,313 the majority-voting protocol, in one
form or another, governed director elections at nearly eighty percent of
Standard & Poor’s 500 companies by 2012.314
To address the difficulty created by elections offering shareholders only
candidates selected by the incumbent board, the SEC twice (in 1978 and
2003) adopted regulations to facilitate shareholder suggestions to
nominating committees.315 Much more aggressively, the SEC in 2003
proposed, but did not adopt, a regulation requiring each public company to
include in its proxy statements and on its proxy forms the names of
candidates nominated by a shareholder, or a group of shareholders.316 The
SEC proposed another version of such a rule in 2009,317 and adopted that
regulation, with further revisions, in 2010,318 after Congress explicitly
granted the Commission the authority to issue such a proxy access rule.319
While the D.C. Circuit vacated the SEC regulation in 2011 on the ground
that the Commission had not adequately apprised itself of costs and

310. Id. at 1005.
311. See Falcone, supra note 303, at 853–56.
312. Kahan & Rock, supra note 305, at 856.
313. Id. at 854–55.
314. Holly J. Gregory, Trends in Director Elections: Key Results from the 2012 Proxy Season,
PRACTICAL LAW THE JOURNAL 20, 20 (2012) (“According to data from Alliance Advisors (using
FactSet and company filings), about 80% of S&P 500 companies have since adopted some form of
majority voting . . . .”) .
315. Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process
and Corporate Governance Generally, 43 Fed. Reg. 58,522, 58,527, 58,831 (Dec. 14, 1978) (adding
then Item 6(d) to Schedule 14A, which, in 6(d)(2), required that a company seeking proxies for
election of directors disclose whether its nominating committee would consider candidates suggested
by shareholders, and, if so, the procedure that shareholders should follow to make suggestions);
Disclosure Regarding Nominating Committee Functions and Communications Between Security
Holders and Boards of Directors, 68 Fed. Reg. 69,204, 69,221 (Dec. 11, 2003) (revising 17 C.F.R. §
240.14a-101 Schedule 14A Item 7(d) (2012), which now cross-references 17 C.F.R. 229.407(c)(2),
with subparts (ii) and (iii) requiring a company to describe its nominating committee’s policy
regarding nominees recommended by shareholders and to state, if it does not have a policy, why the
company believes it is appropriate not to have one).
316. Security Holder Director Nominations, 68 Fed. Reg. 60,784 (Oct. 23, 2003).
317. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 74 Fed. Reg. 29,024 (June 18, 2009).
318. Facilitating Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 56,668 (Sept. 16, 2010).
319. Dodd-Frank, supra note 292, § 971 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(2) (Supp. V 2011).
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benefits,320 the persistent effort to give shareholders access to the company’s
proxy solicitation machinery in order to provide alternatives to the
candidates nominated by the sitting board reflects a continuing commitment
to ensure that the shareholders have a meaningful role, rather than only a
formal role, in selecting corporate directors.
The SEC has also acted to require that mutual funds cast their votes in
director elections in a thoughtful way. As the owner of the stock in its
portfolio companies, a mutual fund has the right to vote that stock in the
director elections at those companies.321 Specifically to “encourage funds to
become more engaged in corporate governance of issuers held in their
portfolios,”322 the SEC adopted in 2003 rules that (i) require the investment
advisors running the funds to adopt and implement “written policies and
procedures that are reasonably designed to ensure that the advisor[s]
vote[]”portfolio company shares “in the best interest of” the funds323 and (ii)
require the funds to disclose how they vote in corporate elections.324
This Article’s purposes do not include arguing that these regulatory
reforms significantly increase shareholder power in most board elections, or
that shareholder votes in director elections regularly and significantly affect
corporate policy.325 But these reforms aim directly at the very factors that
observers say prevent shareholders from effectively exercising their voting

320. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
321. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Practices and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management
Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6,564, 6,564–65 (Feb. 7, 2003) [hereinafter Mutual Fund Proxy
Voting Disclosure].
322. Id. at 6566.
323. Proxy Voting by Investment Advisors, 68 Fed. Reg. 6,585, 6,586, 6,593 (now providing, at
17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)–6(a), that it is a “fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act, practice or
course of business” under the Investment Advisors Act to exercise voting authority for a fund
without adopting and implementing such policies and procedures).
324. Mutual Fund Proxy Voting Disclosure, supra note 321, at 6,581–85 (requiring funds to
disclose their votes in an SEC filing available to the public via the Commission’s database and
revising various forms to mandate that mutual funds advise their shareholders that they can obtain
fund voting records by accessing the SEC database or by requesting information from the fund or, if
the fund posts its voting record on its website, by visiting the fund website); see also 17 C.F.R. §
270.30b1-4 (2012); SEC, Form N-1A, at Item 27(d)(5) (2010); SEC, Annual Report of Proxy Voting
Record of Registered Management Investment Company (Form N-PX) (2003).
325. Recent research shows that shareholder voting can affect company policy even in
uncontested elections. Cai et al., supra note 99, at 2410, 2417 (finding that “a 1% decrease in the
average vote for a compensation committee member reduces unexplained [positive] CEO
compensation by $143,000 in the next year” and that “a 1% decrease in the compensation committee
chair votes is associated with a reduction in unexplained [positive] CEO compensation by
approximately $220,000 in the following year,” with “unexplained CEO compensation” being the
compensation that cannot be predicted by such factors as industry and recent stock returns).

583

01 FISHER SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/2/13 3:07 PM

rights. And the reforms have continued into very recent years. The reforms
therefore manifest a continuing societal commitment to shareholder power—
including, particularly, shareholder power to elect directors.
That
commitment—together with the emergence of activist hedge funds that
have, at least in some number of cases, achieved corporate change through
the threat of shareholder votes in director elections326—weakens any
argument that it is unnecessary or unimportant to know whether government,
instead of shareholders, controls board composition because shareholder
control is either illusory or irrational. It would be passing strange to make
all these efforts to realize shareholder control over board composition, then
deliberately forego shedding light on active interference with that control by
the government—particularly in cases like BofA, where the government
does not exercise such control through any shareholder voting rights that it
holds.327
IV. A PROPOSAL TO CLOSE THE HOLES
Disclosure of government attempts to influence the composition of a
public company’s board in a securities filing available on the SEC’s website
solves all the problems set out above. It provides prompt, material
information about government influence. It permits shareholders to consider
what that influence portends for company strategy. It lets all of us consider
whether government influence is consistent with our notion of what a
corporation is and what purposes it should serve.
This Article therefore proposes a new SEC reporting requirement aimed
specifically at government efforts to change a public company’s board
membership, a requirement to file a new Form GIB (“Government Influence
on Board”), which when submitted would be immediately available on the
database that the SEC maintains for public access. Such a proposal raises
five questions, addressed in the subparts that follow: (1) What should a
Form GIB disclose?;328 (2) When should the Form be filed?;329 (3) Who
should file the Form?;330 (4) Should the filing requirement include an
exception applying when the government determines that disclosure is likely
to produce significant harm?;331 and (5) Do we really need to require

326. See Bratton, supra note 304, at 1405–06 (documenting a high proportion of instances in
sample in which activist funds in hostile engagements with targets obtained concessions, including
“board membership (40% of the hostile targets), sale or liquidation of the target (28%), and the sale
or the sale or spin off of a division (21%)”).
327. See supra Part II.B.
328. See infra Part V.A.
329. See infra Part V.B.
330. See infra Part V.C.
331. See infra Part V.D.
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disclosure by creating the new Form GIB, or can we simply rely on
companies and the government to tell us when the government tries to
change a board?332
A. What to Disclose
Clearly, disclosure should include the fact of government influence,
identify the communication through which the government exercised its
influence, and provide the date of the communication. But the report should
identify the participants in the communication as well—the name and title of
the government official and the name and title of the company participant.333
The more highly placed the government participant, or the more power the
official has over the company as a result of his or her position, the greater
the pressure will be. The more influential the company participant, the more
likely the pressure will be communicated to those in the company who
matter—who could encourage sitting directors to leave the board or affect
the selection of new directors between shareholder meetings, or control
nominations at future shareholder meetings.
The report should include the substance of the communication—what
was said. That substance includes the board change that the government
requests, suggests, demands, or recommends, set out in the same detail as in
the communication itself. If the government includes a time frame in which
it wishes or demands or recommends the change occur, the report should
include that, too. The extent and the schedule of the government’s desired
change constitute, by definition, the influence that the government seeks to
exert. If the government states that unless the company makes the change,
the government will take some action against the company or withhold some
benefit from the company, the Form GIB should include those statements.
That part of the communication identifies the power that the government is
using to effectuate the change and affects the likelihood that the company
will make the change the government wants.
The report, relatedly, should include the form of the communication.
332. See infra Part V.E.
333. The securities law in other areas requires accounts of particular conversations or meetings.
For example, a company seeking proxies from shareholders to approve a merger must describe past
contacts and negotiations leading to the proposed deal. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Schedule 14A,
Item 14(b)(7) (2012) (cross-referencing 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.1005(b)–229.1005(c)). See the
descriptions of two conversations between Ken Lewis and John Thain on September 13, 2008
included in the proxy solicitation to shareholders of BofA and Merrill Lynch in connection with the
merger of those two companies. Bank of Am. Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 49 (Nov.
3, 2008).
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The form of the suggestion, recommendation, or demand affects the power
behind it.334 In the BofA case, the fact that the government sought a board
change through a bank regulatory enforcement mechanism (the MOU) put
special force behind the government’s stated desire.335
The report should include the reason or purpose for the government’s
request, suggestion, demand, or recommendation to the extent that the
communication revealed that reason or purpose. Particularly in the case of a
bank in which the government does not have a significant equity interest and
therefore does not have a simple profit motive—and in light of the fact that
bank regulatory authorities can issue an MOU whether or not the
government owns an equity interest in a bank or its holding company—the
reason for the government’s effort to change the board may be unclear. That
is, even where the government has a well-defined reason for intervening in
the affairs of a financial institution (e.g., to prevent the bank from engaging
in unsound practices consisting of particular kinds of transactions),
identification of that reason may not explain why the government is seeking
to change the board as opposed to, for example, simply forbidding the bank
from entering into the kind of transaction that the government deems
unsound. The government might want a board change because it concludes
that the board cannot adequately monitor the executives at a company, or
because the government believes that the board needs greater expertise in
some area such as risk analysis and control.336 Whatever the expressed
reason, the Form GIB should reveal it.
B. When to Disclose
We should require disclosure only of serious government efforts to
change a public company board. A casual comment by one government
official to another—no matter how lofty their positions on an organization
chart—should not trigger a filing, for such a trigger would inhibit discussion
among officials. Nor should an out-loud rumination by a midlevel
government worker to a company officer or employee of modest authority

334. Fitzpatrick, Obey, supra note 79, at C1 (reporting that BofA was operating under a secret
regulatory sanction that required it to overhaul its board and “address perceived problems with risk
and liquidity management”).
335. Id. (“The MOU is the most serious procedural action taken against Bank of America by
federal regulators since the financial crisis erupted.”); see supra Part II.B.2.
336. The securities laws and regulations are no strangers to a requirement that filers state their
purpose. A purchaser of more than five percent of a class of a public company’s equity securities
must file a Schedule 13D that, among other things, must state the “purpose of the purchase or
prospective purchases,” including “any plans or proposals” for an extraordinary corporate
transaction such as a merger, a sale of a material amount of the company’s assets, or “any other
major change in [the issuer’s] business or corporate structure.” 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1)(C) (2006); 17
C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1(a), 240.13d-101 Items 4, 4(b), (c), (f) (2012).
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prompt a report. Such talk is so unlikely to change board membership that
reporting it would needlessly clutter the information landscape.337
The effort to define a disclosure trigger could proceed by considering a
wide continuum of government-company contacts, all varying by
participants and substance. Such an analysis could produce a multifactor
test that would determine when to require disclosure of government
pressure. The law, securities law in particular, includes such tests.338 But
multiple criteria of this sort are hard to apply, and while securities law
sometimes employs deliberately general rules,339 the SEC often opts for
bright lines.340 This Article favors a clear and easily applied test, in part
because it will facilitate compliance and lower cost by minimizing counsel
hours spent mulling multiple factors.
A bright-line test will also advance the goal of timely disclosure. The
current Form 8-K requires a report of board departures and additions341
within four business days of the event.342 This Article proposes a similar
deadline for disclosure of government pressure to change a board. A brightline trigger should help reporting parties identify a reportable event quickly,
without any need for lengthy legal consultation, and thereby meet this fourday deadline.
To ease compliance, permit rapid identification of instances in which a
report is due, and capture the instances in which serious government
pressure to change a board occurs, a Form GIB should be filed within four
business days of:
337. The securities laws have long been sensitive to this very consideration. See, e.g., Basic, Inc.
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (noting the need to avoid setting too low a floor for
materiality, as a “minimal standard might bring an overabundance of information within its reach”
and produce “‘an avalanche of trivial information’”) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc.,
426 U.S. 438, 448 (1976)).
338. See, e.g., Non-Public Offering Exemption, 27 Fed. Reg. 11,316, 11,317 (Nov. 16, 1962)
(describing the five-factor test for integration of offerings); HAZEN, supra note 216, § 4.24[1]
(explaining the multifactor test for an exemption from registration under section 4(2) of the
Securities Act of 1933).
339. The legal test for materiality is very general, and the Supreme Court has rejected efforts to
reduce that test to a bright-line criterion, even in specific contexts. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v.
Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1318–21 (2011).
340. To address the uncertainty created by the multifactor test for integrating offerings, the rules
for exempt offerings include bright-line safe harbors that will ensure that offerings are not
integrated. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a) (2012). To address the uncertainty created by the
multifactor test for the section 4(2) exemption from registration, the regulations governing exempt
offerings include a detailed rule, which, if issuers comply with its more certain criteria, will exempt
an offering from the 33 Act registration requirement. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2012).
341. Supra notes 148–50, 154–55 and accompanying text.
342. SEC Form 8-K, supra note 147, at General Instruction B.1.

587

01 FISHER SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

4/2/13 3:07 PM

1. a communication by any federal government official in the
executive branch (including any independent entity in that branch,
such as the Federal Reserve),
a. acting in his or her official capacity,
b. directly or indirectly,
2. with a public company’s chief executive officer, or any current
board member,
3. in which the government official,
a. directs, requests, recommends, or states a preference that the
company change its board membership (including any
endorsement of a board change, where the company has
requested such an endorsement, and any statement that the
government does not object to a board change, where the
company has asked whether the government objects or not), or
b. states that the government will direct a change in board
membership unless the company makes the change that the
official identifies, or
c. states that another government action, which affects the
company, is more or less likely depending on whether the
company changes its board membership.
By limiting the trigger to contacts between the government and the
corporation, the trigger will not require a report when the government, inter
se, discusses the desirability of a board change. By limiting the trigger to
contacts with the highest executive in the public company or any member of
the sitting board, the trigger will require a report only when the
government’s direction, request, endorsement, or statement of preference is
so serious that the government has communicated it to the very highest
levels of the company. By limiting the trigger to communications from an
official in the executive branch acting in his or her official capacity, the rule
permits any official to express a personal opinion without triggering a report.
The “official capacity” limitation also forestalls GIB filings to report off-thecuff comments that do not reflect government policy.
By mandating a filing when an executive branch official makes the
reportable communication “indirectly,” as well as “directly,” the trigger aims
to defeat efforts to bypass the disclosure requirement by communicating a
direction, request, statement of preference, or endorsement to an
intermediary such as a general counsel, and asking that the intermediary pass
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the substance of the communication on to the CEO or the current board.
Admittedly, including indirect contacts introduces a modicum of ambiguity.
But without including “indirect” communications, the reporting rule could
be easily bypassed. Moreover, the securities laws and rules regularly
employ the phrase “directly or indirectly,”343 so it is familiar to lawyers
advising the reporting parties.
Including communications by the government “directly or indirectly”
with a company’s top executive or any board member would reach any case
like BofA. A government official might, by bureaucratic rule, address an
MOU or other stylized communication to some particular corporate
officer—such as a compliance officer—with the intention that the document
travel to the CEO and the board.
Without including “indirect”
communications in the new rule, such a bureaucratic routine could frustrate
disclosure.
Similar reasoning motivates the inclusion of communications in which
the government endorses a board change that the company suggests, where
the company seeks such an endorsement. Without requiring disclosure of
those contacts, the government and companies could defeat the disclosure
mandate by simply adding a few steps to the dance. For example, a top
Treasury official might say to a board chair that the Treasury would like to
“be in the loop” on board changes. The board chair might then run
prospective changes by some Treasury official, asking in each case whether
the Treasury had an objection. A government official stating that the
Treasury had no objection would state a preference within the meaning of
the rule, and the rule would therefore require a filing to report the Treasury’s
blessing.
To trigger a report, a communication must concern a “change in board
membership.” For this purpose a “change in board membership” means the
departure of one or more directors or the addition of one or more directors.
A departure includes a resignation, removal for cause, a failure to renominate for another term, or a refusal to stand for reelection. An addition
includes the election of a director by the board between shareholder
meetings or the nomination of a director candidate who is not an incumbent.
The new rule would require a report when the government identifies

343. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (and related 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2012), prohibiting “any person” [from] “directly or indirectly” committing deceptive acts in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (2006 & Supp. V 2011)
(making it unlawful for “any person, directly or indirectly” to make a tender offer without filing
forms as the SEC requires if, after successful completion of the offer, the person would own more
than five percent of an equity security registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act).
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particular directors who should resign or be added, or when the government
phrases the desired board change in more general terms, such as that some
particular number or percentage of the directors should be replaced or that
directors with particular characteristics should be added to the board.
A communication triggers a report under this new rule not only when
the government directs that a public company change its board but also
when the government requests such a change or when the government states
a preference for such a change. Otherwise, the government could avoid a
report by pressuring a company for a change without employing words that
constituted a direction or even a request. If a government official tells the
CEO or a sitting director at a public company that the federal government
prefers that the company change the membership of its board of directors,
the CEO or director will almost certainly pass that statement of preference
on to the board as a whole, and the board will almost certainly feel pressured
to make the change.
The other instances in which a communication triggers a report require
little comment. Clearly, the government applies pressure for board change
when it tells a company’s top management or the company’s board that the
government will order a change if the company does not make the change
itself. And a communication that government action is more or less likely
depending on whether a company makes a board change is pressure of
perhaps the most effective sort. For example, the government could have
very effectively exerted pressure on a bank during the credit crisis simply by
stating that, unless the company changed its board, the government would be
unlikely to provide financial assistance to the bank if the bank experienced
financial distress.
The new rule covers only communications from the executive branch
and does not apply to communications between legislators and public
companies. The rule’s efficacy suffers to some extent as a result. Legislators
can pressure companies and, if they affect board composition, their pressure
implicates all the concerns previously set out.
But senators and
representatives generally speak for themselves rather than for the branch of
government of which they are a part, and so are less likely to wield effective
pressure. Moreover, a legislator may well actively seek publicity for any
demand or request that he or she makes for a board change, believing that
the publicity itself will increase the pressure that he or she applies.
Therefore, required disclosure is likely not needed. As set out below, just
the opposite is true when an arm of the executive branch applies the
pressure: there are sound reasons to conclude that the executive branch is
unlikely to disclose the pressure it exerts absent a requirement that it do so.344

344.
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C. Who Should Disclose
Logically, there are only two candidates on whom to impose the
disclosure obligation: (i) the public company whose board composition the
government tries to influence or (ii) the government itself.345 It is tempting
to require the government to file. As set out in Part V.A, the disclosure
ideally should state why the government is trying to change the board. The
government knows its purpose better than the company. Moreover, if (as
Part V.A proposes) the report only includes the government’s reasoning
when the government includes that reasoning in the triggering
communication, the government can avoid inclusion of its purpose in a Form
GIB filing simply by refraining from stating that purpose in the
government’s communication with the company.
While all of these reasons argue for imposing the filing requirement on
the government, doing so invites implementation and enforcement problems.
First, a government filing would require legislation. Congress would need to
except the new filing from Exchange Act section 3(c), the law that generally
exempts the government from securities compliance.346 Second, the SEC is
itself a part of the executive branch.347 It could prove awkward for the SEC
to bring an enforcement action against another part of the executive branch
for failing to file a Form GIB.
On the other hand, the securities laws regularly impose disclosure
obligations on public companies,348 and the Exchange Act provides the
authority for a regulation requiring that companies file Form GIB.349 Those
companies have internal staffs and protocols, as well as outside counsel, who
routinely assist them in complying with disclosure obligations, so a
compliance infrastructure is already in place.350 Moreover, the securities

345. The current requirement lies with the company, see supra Part III.D, and the government is
the only other party with influence regarding composition decisions under these circumstances.
346. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
347. The SEC “is a freestanding component of the Executive Branch.” Free Enterprise Fund v.
Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S.Ct. 3138, 3163 (2010). The president appoints the SEC
commissioners. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006).
348. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2006) (companies with stock registered under section 12 of the
Securities and Exchange Act shall file with the SEC such information and reports as the SEC
requires).
349. The Commission could rely on sections 10, 12, 13, 15, and 23 of the Securities Exchange
Act for the new form, just as it has for changes in Form 8-K. Additional Form 8-K Disclosure
Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date, 69 Fed. Reg. 15,594, 15,613 (Mar. 25, 2004).
350. And companies already disclose government actions that the acting agencies do not disclose.
For example, SEC investigations are confidential, and the agency accordingly does not publicize
them. 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(a) (2012). Yet, companies may, under some circumstances, have to
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laws provide the SEC with a panoply of enforcement tools to apply to
companies, and individuals within them, who fail to file prescribed
reports.351
D. Possible Objections and Exceptions
The government might assert that disclosing its efforts to change boards
will hurt, not help. In particular, the government might argue generally, or
in a particular case, that disclosing its efforts to change the board at a
financial institution might cause a “run on the bank,” thereby forcing the
closure of an institution that otherwise could have survived.
The
government might also contend, either generally or in a particular case, that
disclosing its attempts to effectively fire or hire directors at a company such
as BofA could hurt that company’s innocent stockholders.
Such arguments have little merit in most cases. The proposal here is
limited to those actions designed to change the boards at companies that are
already publicly traded and that will continue to operate after the anticipated
board change.352 Those companies already must file compendious financial
information with the SEC in periodic reports (on Forms 10-Q and 10-K),353
and in reports (on Form 8-K) addressing particularly important financial

disclose them. See Steven S. Scholes, An Overview of SEC Investigations and Enforcement
Proceedings, in INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS 2011: INVESTIGATIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF DODDFRANK 291, 315–17 (Practising Law Institute 2011). The regulatory authorities already recognize
that banks may in some circumstances have to disclose MOUs in SEC filings. See supra note 119
and accompanying text. Some companies have disclosed MOUs. See, e.g., First Chester Cnty.
Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 20, 2009).
351. See 2 MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES ch. 12
(2012).
352. The proposal would therefore not affect any confidentiality required at the inception of a
receivership under Title II of Dodd-Frank. See Dodd-Frank, supra note 292, §§ 202(a)(1)(A)(iii),
202(a)(1)(C) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5382(a)(1)(A)(iii) & (C) (Supp. IV 2011)). Although the
receiver must “ensure that the [directors] responsible for the failed condition” of the failed financial
institution “are removed,” 12 U.S.C. § 5386(5) (Supp. IV 2011), the receiver rather than the board
runs the company during the receivership, 12 U.S.C. § 5390(a)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 2011), and may
exercise all powers of the board, § 5390(a)(1)(C)—in order to liquidate and wind up the financial
institution, 5390(a)(1)(D). See also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 4 (2010) (“liquidation is the only option;
the failing financial company may not be kept open or rehabilitated”). Accordingly, the receivership
inaugurates not board change at a company that will continue in business but replacement of the
board by the receiver at a company that will go out of business. Accordingly, communications about
a receivership would not trigger a Form GIB filing.
353. If a company trades on a national exchange, it must as a practical matter register under § 12
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”). 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a) (2006).
Companies registered under the Exchange Act must file reports on Forms 10-K and 10-Q. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13a-1 (2012) (requiring annual reports on the forms the SEC prescribes); 17 C.F.R. §
249.310(a) (2012) (identifying Form 10-K as the default form for annual reports); 17 C.F.R. §
240.13a-13 (2012) (requiring companies registered under section 12 to file Form 10-Q). Both
reports require financial statements and discussion of financial condition and results. SEC Form 10K, supra note 140, at Items 7, 8; SEC, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at Part I, Items 1, 2 (2010).
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events that occur between the periodic reports.354 Accordingly, if the
government seeks to change a publicly traded company’s board for a reason
related to financial missteps that threaten solvency, the public should in most
cases already know of that dismal performance before the government acts.
For example, it was clear to all—before the MOU with BofA in May 2009—
that BofA was experiencing severe financial distress.355 And the company’s
stock price had already fallen by the time the government imposed the
MOU.356 Moreover, neither the Wall Street Journal story on the MOU nor
any of the announced director departures or arrivals in May through
September of 2008 caused a run on the bank.357
While the BofA case provides an instance in which disclosure of the
government effort to change the board had no ill effects, it is possible that
disclosure of such an effort might cause harm in some other case. This
section therefore proposes a narrow exception to the new disclosure
requirement. For the government to employ the exception, the new rule
requires that, before filing a Form GIB, a public company must advise the
government official making the triggering communication that the company
is about to file. The company will thereafter not file only if two conditions
are satisfied:
1. the most senior government officer at the government entity
trying to make the board change notifies the company that he or she
has concluded that disclosure would harm the public interest, and

354. Companies registered under section 12 of the Exchange Act must file Forms 8-K, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13a-1, 240.13a-11, with an 8-K filing required after such financial developments as the
creation of a direct or off-balance sheet financial obligation in a material amount, events that
accelerate or increase such an obligation, material charges associated with exiting a business or
disposing of a business, and impairment charges in material amounts. SEC Form 8-K, supra note
147 , at Items 2.03–2.06.
355. BofA reported net income for the 2007 year of $14.982 billion. Bank of Am. Corp., Annual
Report (Form 10-K), at 89 (Feb. 28, 2008). The company reported net income of only $4.008 billion
for 2008. Bank of Am. Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 110 (Feb. 27, 2009). The company
cut its quarterly dividend from $.64 per share to $.32 per share in the fourth quarter of 2008 and
reduced the dividend to $.01 per share in the first quarter of 2009. Bank of Am. Corp., Annual
Report (Form 10-K), at 13 (Feb. 26, 2010).
356. The closing price of BofA’s stock plummeted from $ 53.33 per share on January 3, 2007, to
$ 40.56 on January 2, 2008, to $ 14.33 on January 2, 2009, to $8.70 on May 1, 2009. See Bank of
America
(BAC),
Historical
Prices,
YAHOO!
FINANCE,
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=BofA+Historical+Prices.
357. See supra Part II.B.
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2. the government’s effort to change the company’s board is related
to events that are not yet public.
The government has two business days in which to provide this notification,
and those two days do not count towards the four days within which the
company must file the Form GIB.
The first condition for the exception means that, if the communication
by which the government exerted its influence originates from an office
inside the Department of the Treasury, only the Secretary of the Treasury
can make the determination that disclosure will harm the public interest. If
the communication originates from the Federal Reserve Bank, only the
Federal Reserve Board Chairman can make the determination. Requiring
the official at the apex of that part of the government seeking board change
to make a formal determination that disclosure will hurt the country provides
accountability and emphasizes that such a determination to deprive investors
and the public of disclosure is a serious matter and, hence, the rare
exception.
As a second, separate, and independent condition for the disclosure
exception, the government can only prevent the Form GIB filing if the
filing’s harm to the public interest results from secret circumstances. Put
another way, if the circumstances prompting the government to exercise its
influence over the composition of the publicly traded company’s board are
public knowledge, then the company must file the Form GIB—regardless of
what any officer in the executive branch thinks about possible harm that the
filing will cause. This additional condition makes sense for two reasons.
First, without some objective test of this sort, it will be all too easy for an
executive branch official to conclude that a filing will harm the public
interest because, for the reasons set out below, the filing will harm the
government official.358 For example, an officer chary of being labeled a
socialist if his or her effort to change a private company’s board is reported
in the media might easily talk himself or herself into the conclusion that the
public is better off not knowing of the effort at all.359
The second reason derives from the circumstance that the harm to the
public interest—for example by a run on the bank—will derive, most likely,
not from the government’s intervention to change directors, but from some
underlying condition that prompts that intervention. Accordingly, if that
underlying condition is already public, then the public interest is already
likely to have suffered any “harm,” from that knowledge, with no additional
harm likely from the subsequent revelation that the government is acting to

358.
359.

594

See infra Part V.E.
See infra notes 366–74 and accompanying text.

01 FISHER SSRN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

[Vol. 40: 533, 2013]

4/2/13 3:07 PM

Investors Should Know
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

address the problem.360 On the other hand, if for example a bank is
somehow in deep trouble that is not revealed by its own securities filings,
and revelation of a federal effort to change the board might signal that
distress and thereby cause a run, the case for an exception to the new
disclosure strengthens.
E. Why Disclosure Must Be Required
A final and critical question remains: if disclosure of government
influence on public company board composition benefits investors and the
rest of the public, why cannot we simply leave disclosure to the good
thinking of those who control the government or those who control the
companies? They could take the template set out above and make voluntary
disclosures.
The BofA case361 provides an immediate response. Though apparently
dated in early May 2009,362 the BofA MOU did not surface until mid-July.363
Even then, only a vigilant press brought that MOU to light.364 Neither the
government nor BofA disclosed the document,365 which suggests that both
had reasons for not doing so. Voluntary disclosure did not get the job done.
We do not know the motives for secrecy particular to the BofA case.
But we can speculate on those motives intelligently based on the events
during which that case unfolded. With our understanding of human nature
and the nature of government and corporations, we can also speculate more
generally about the reasons that those in government, and those in
corporations, may wish to keep Uncle Sam’s influence on board membership
in the shadows.
The government—really the individuals within the executive branch
who are behind a board change—may want to keep their influence quiet in
order to avoid political criticism for interference with private enterprise.
The experience of 2008 and 2009 brings this home. As the Treasury took
equity positions in hundreds of banks and the government invested in AIG
and General Motors,366 the dreaded word “nationalization” vibrated through

360. As was the case with BofA. See supra notes 355–56 and accompanying text.
361. See supra Part II.B.
362. Fitzpatrick, Obey, supra note 79 (“The order was imposed in early May. . . .”).
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. See supra Part II.B.5.
366. An early 2010 transaction report showed purchases of preferred stock, warrants, and debt
obligations in hundreds of banks and financial institutions, as well as General Motors, GMAC, and
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the financial press,367 with that word in popular parlance encompassing
“effective control” of banks or other companies even without majority
ownership.368 Pundits, politicians, and professors opined that nationalization
was un-American.369 While the administration shied away from the term,370
even the possibility of nationalization reportedly drove day-to-day stock
market declines.371 Concerns emerged that, once started, nationalization
would spread in a “contagion”372 and that, once the government got into the

Chrysler. U.S. Treasury Dep’t, Office of Financial Stability, Troubled Asset Relief Program,
Transactions Report (Mar. 24, 2010) (on file with author).
367. See Jonathan Alter, A Plan That Obama Can Bank On, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 23, 2009, at 30
(“The second option is to nationalize the banks. True nationalization means permanent government
ownership, which is favored only by a few aging socialists. If things get bad enough, we could get a
temporary takeover, but calling it nationalization just polarizes the debate.”); Andy Kessler, Why
Markets Dissed the Geithner Plan, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 2009, at A17 (“Six months to a year from
now, big banks may still be weak and the ugly . . . word . . . nationalization will be back.”); Paul
Krugman, Op-Ed., Wall Street Voodoo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2009, at A25 (“Washington remains
deathly afraid of” that word.).
368. See David E. Sanger, Selling a New Deal, but Promising It Will Be Brief, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
25, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/25/us/politics/24web-sanger.html.
By the time Mr. Obama speaks, taxpayers may already own 40 percent of Citigroup.
As Senator Charles Grassley, Republican of Iowa, asked yesterday in a letter to Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner, wouldn’t that “give the government effective control of the
bank, and therefore, be a de facto nationalization of the bank”?
Id.
369. A Princeton economist offered that “nationalization runs counter to deeply ingrained
American traditions and attitudes.” Alan S. Blinder, Nationalize? Hey, Not So Fast, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 8, 2009, § 3 (Money and Business), at 5. Financial historian Charles Geisst agreed, saying that
“[n]ationalization . . . ‘is just not a term in the American vocabulary.’” David E. Sanger, US Bank
and Trust?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, at A1.. One columnist opined that “[f]ew words conjure the
specter of radicalism quite so well as nationalization,” bringing to the popular mind visions of
“leftist governments” and images of Lenin and Hugo Chavez. David Leonhardt, The Way We Live
Now: Banks of America, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009, § 6 (Magazine), at 11. A publisher and
commentator asked and answered: “Nationalize banks? A horror.” Steve Forbes, 1933 Is Coming
Again, FORBES, Mar. 16, 2009, at 13. The Wall Street Journal reported that “Republicans already
are uncomfortable with . . . the effective nationalization of . . . insurer AIG.” Greg Hitt et al.,
Bailout Turns on Auto Makers’ Viability, WALL ST. J., Nov. 13, 2008, at A3.
370. See Edmund L. Andrews, Common Stock Offers Leeway in Bank Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
20, 2009, at A1 (“Nationalization, or even just the hint of nationalization, is a politically explosive
step that White House and Treasury officials have fought hard to avoid.”).
371. See Jon Hisenrath et al., Heard on the Street: Banks Hit by Nationalization Fears, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 21, 2009, at A1 (“Shares of the biggest names in American banking plunged Tuesday as
some investors feared that the government would need to nationalize the most deeply wounded
financial institutions, wiping out shareholders.”).
372. See Tyler Cowen, Three Rocky Roads to a Bank Rescue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009, § 3
(Money and Business), at 5.
The most obvious problem with nationalization is the risk of contagion. If the
government wipes out equity holders at some banks, why would investors want to put
money into healthier but still marginal institutions? A small number of planned
nationalizations could thus lead to a much larger number of undesired nationalizations.
Id.
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banking business, it would be hard to get the government out.373 All of this
evoked an even more reviled word—“socialism.”374
Surely, no executive branch official seeking to influence board
composition at a publicly traded company would relish triggering such a
public relations firestorm. He or she would, instead, seek to avoid even the
remotest possibility of such a PR disaster. The official would grasp at any
rationale to keep actions behind the curtain.
Executive officials might wish to proceed behind closed doors, as well,
because an open effort could draw congressional attention, with the possible
need to accommodate the idiosyncratic preferences of those legislators who
might seek out cameras and microphones to express their views on the
“right” directors to have at the company in question. Again, the experience
of 2008 and 2009 supports this fear, when representatives and senators
sought to influence all kinds of actions taken by companies that the
government was helping. Congress politicized bonus payments at AIG.375
Legislators used the bully pulpit to force companies to sell corporate
planes.376 When the federal plan to restructure General Motors involved

373. See Paul Ryan, A Republican Road to Economic Recovery, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2009, at
A15 (“There are no easy or painless solutions, but the most damaging solution over the long term
would be to nationalize our financial system. Once we put politicians in charge of allocating credit
and resources in our economy, it is hard to imagine them letting go.”).
374. See Steve Lohr, Bold Action With Basis In History, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2008, at A1
(“Elsewhere, government bank-investment programs are routinely called nationalization programs.
But that is not likely in the United States, where nationalization is a word to avoid, given the
aversion to anything that hints of socialism.”); Gerald P. O’Driscoll, The Problem with
‘Nationalization,’ WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2009, at A15 (addressing a Greenspan comment that bank
nationalization occurs about once a century and Senator Graham’s view that nationalization should
proceed if it works, a Cato Institute senior fellow opined: “That is the kind of pragmatism that leads
to socialism.”).
375. When AIG paid out $165 million in bonuses after the government bailout of that company,
CEO Edward Liddy endured sharp questioning in congressional testimony even though he said he
had asked bonus recipients to give back one half of the money; “Democratic leaders in Congress”
were reportedly “furious” that the bonuses were paid. Mary Williams Walsh & David M.
Herszenhorn, A.I.G. Seeking Return of Half of Its Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2009, at A1. The
House even passed a ninety percent retroactive tax on the bonuses. Carl Hulse & David M.
Herszenhorn, A.I.G. and Wall St. Confronts an Upsurge of Populist Fury, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
2009, at A1.
376. When the heads of the three auto companies flew into Washington on private jets to seek
bailout assistance, legislators mocked the executives for their extravagance. Robert Peele, They’d
Rather Be Flying, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2008, http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/19/theydrather-be-flying/. Shortly thereafter, General Motors, though claiming not to act in response to
public pressure, reduced its fleet of corporate planes from five to three. Joseph Rhee & Maddy
Sauer, GM Downsizing Jet Fleet, CEO Still Flies High, ABC NEWS, Nov. 21, 2008,
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/WallStreet/story?id=6307092&page=1. About two months later, the
financial press reported that, “[f]acing outrage from some lawmakers, Citigroup now says that it will
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closing dealerships, Congress held a hearing on that move.377 The executive
branch might fear that publicly aired efforts to reconstitute a large
company’s board would draw similar fire.
Where Congress travels, so will lobbyists. And the government officials
suggesting or imposing a board change might wish to avoid lobbying by
stakeholders in a corporation at which the government seeks board change.
Lobbyists working for institutional investors, labor unions, and business
affiliates, such as the car dealers in the case of General Motors, might pitch
their board candidates, perhaps warning of political backlash should the
names they suggest be ignored. Finally, the government may believe that
applying pressure cloaked from the public eye will serve some public
purpose apart from politics, in particular protecting a financial institution
from a run on the bank, as Part V.D discussed.
The company whose board the government seeks to change may also
want to avoid disclosure. The sitting directors may, perhaps rightly, see the
government pressure as a judgment that they have failed to properly
discharge their duties. In that case, the departing directors may prefer a lowprofile exit to headlines in business publications suggesting that they have
been sent packing for poor performance. The current directors may also fear
that disclosure of government pressure to make changes at the very top of
the corporation will hurt the company’s stock price. Or the board and
management might remain silent because the government demands that the
company make no disclosure. Indeed, if the company’s condition is such
that it will change its board at the government’s behest, the company is
probably in no condition to resist an additional admonition to keep the
government role in corporate regime change on the QT.378
For these several reasons, the public will not assuredly get disclosure
unless it is required. As in the BofA case, an enterprising press may bring to
light government efforts to give the boot to some directors and a warm
welcome to others. But we cannot count on the press regularly defeating
what could be coordinated company and government efforts to keep the
pressure under wraps. Only a disclosure requirement will get the news out
reliably.

not take delivery of a brand-new $50 million corporate jet.” Cyrus Sanati, Citi Reverses Course on
$50 Million Jet, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/citi-reversescourse-on-50-million-jet/.
377. See Bernie Becker, Closing Dealers Is Painful but Vital, G.M. and Chrysler Tell Panel, N.Y.
TIMES, June 4, 2009, at B4.
378. Or, as the younger crowd would say, on the DL.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The credit crisis—with its massive government investment in
multimillion dollar publicly traded companies—has faded. The government
has unwound many of its investments and aims to unwind virtually all, if
possible.379 Government control over public company boards by virtue of
federal stock holdings—as at AIG—may therefore be rare, at least in the
near future. Moreover, as this Article has shown, investors (and the general
public) can guess pretty intelligently about government control over board
composition after a public revelation that the government has acquired
majority shareholder voting rights at a company.380
Unlike direct government investment in voting stock, however, bank
regulation lives on today, complete with the power to issue MOUs that
require board change.381 The BofA case, in which the government
intervened without share-based voting power, could easily repeat itself. And
that case, as we have seen, was far more troublesome, as virtually no SEC
rule required contemporaneous disclosure of government influence on
director departures or arrivals at the bank.382 It is precisely to shed light on
that worse case that the SEC should adopt the disclosure rule that this Article
advocates. For when the government takes control of a board, the
government knows. The company knows. Investors should know, too.

379. When the government restructured its investment in AIG in early 2011, see supra note 19,
the Acting Assistant Treasury Secretary for Financial Stability labeled the AIG transaction a
“milestone in the government’s long-stated efforts to exit our investments in private companies as
soon as practical while protecting taxpayers.” Michael J. de la Merced, U.S. Prepares to Sell Part of
A.I.G. Stake, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2010, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/12/08/a-i-g-plans-bigsale-of-treasurys-shares-next-quarter/. And the government has indeed sold all of its AIG common
stock. See supra note 19.
380. See supra Part II.A.4.
381. See FED. BANK EXAMINATION MANUAL, supra note 77, § 5040.1 at 6.
382. See supra Part II.B, Part III.E.
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